Abstract

CALOCA OSORIO, Oscar Rogelio. Del individuo racional al individuo con creencias, un mecanismo de elección. Econ: teor. práct [online]. 2012, n.37, pp.33-58. ISSN 2448-7481.

In the present investigation it is written on the comparison between the rational individual and the "creencial" individual, focusing the thematic one surroundings to the conditional rational belief by the external uncertainty and internal uncertainty and the internal uncertainty observed through the rule of Jeffrey, the purpose of establishing a game, where final resolution implies a mechanism of election of strategies on the part of the players, with base in external uncertainty and internal uncertainty, indicating that the fundamental difference between a rational and a "creencial" individual is the probability of the second of choosing irrationally, with a null degree of certainty. This is through the speculation.

Keywords : economic election; rational belief; theory of games; uncertainty; rule of Jeffrey.

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