Introduction

The objective of this study is to analyze the policy of technological transference and innovation in México's agricultural sector from 1980 to 2015, addressing the main milestones and institutional changes related to the sector, in addition to rescuing the Program for Integral Innovation and Extension Projects (Programa de Proyectos Integrales de Innovación y Extensión, PIIEX)¹ as an instrument of public policy that is related to innovation and technological transference in the agricultural sector, which had the principal objective of influencing the performance of these variables in the groups benefitted.

The methodology used is based on document revision about the policy of technological transference and innovation in México from 1980 to 2012, while from 2013 to 2015, 40 interviews were performed with operative members of different ranks from the PIIEX program and beneficiaries, through the Direction of Abilities Development, Technological Innovation and Rural Extension (Dirección de Desarrollo de Capacidades, Innovación Tecnológica y Extensionismo Rural) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Production, Rural Development, Fishery and Food ( Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, SAGARPA), in addition to compiling information through attendance to various events carried out by the Ministry related to the agricultural extension programs.

Something that should be mentioned is that the last period we are referring to is mostly descriptive, given that the policies and programs implemented were still in the development process when this study was carried out, so it was hasty to judge the results from those instruments, although it does allows to present the evolution of the policy and its conception.

The history of the agricultural sector in México includes a large number of factors that, without a doubt, are necessary to understand its development. Given how complex and vast the theme is, in this study we will refer to a series of relevant facts or milestones that help to understand the processes of technological transference in the sector, in charge of extension workers and fundamentally those who relate to the policies of technological transference and innovation, and how these impact the activities of the beneficiaries.

Historically, the agricultural sector in México has been a fundamental element to understand the economic and social development of the country, but it was starting in 1940 and at least until 1965 that agriculture played a fundamental role as the basis of economic development, since it provided the foods necessary for the growing population, as well as raw materials for the expanding industry (^{Fujigaki, 2004}), allowing México to change in few years from a rural society to an urban one.

Since the beginning of the 1940s, international research organisms, particularly in the United States, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, collaborated with the government in the Green Revolution project with the idea of facilitating rural and agricultural development in the country, through the promotion of crops of greater value. For this purpose, it was supported by a process of technological improvements that included the introduction of improved varieties, irrigation and the use of pesticides and mineral fertilizers for basic crops, together with investments in institutional infrastructures and new research programs (^{FAO, 1996}).This, together with the technical assistance, had the result of a very important increase in productivity, particularly for developing countries, including México (^{OCDE, 2011}).

At the beginning of the 20^th Century, the development of agricultural extension work and research began. Governmental support was consolidated after World War II with the creation of the Office for Special Studies. In the 1970s, the National Institute for Agricultural and Livestock Research (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agropecuarias, INIA) was founded, currently INIFAP, which coincided with the Green Revolution project. During this period, Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo, Colegio de Postgraduados and Universidad Autónoma Agraria Antonio Narro also contributed to the emergence of the agricultural research system in México, and the training of extension workers. Starting those years and until 1990 the government developed an agricultural transference system supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos), today SAGARPA, through the Direction of the Agricultural Extension System and research from INIA. The first was in charge of close to 25 000 extension workers, who had the task of supporting import substitution, food security and backing for subsistence farmers, concentrating in the basic foods such as maize, wheat, bean, rice and sorghum (^{OCDE, 2011}).

The studies performed during the period of the Green Revolution were limited at first to maize and wheat, but later they extended to bean, potato, vegetables, sorghum, barley, fodder and livestock. The results were new varieties, resistant to pests, drought and insects, and with a better development cycle (^{Fujigaki, 2004}). Centered particularly in Sonora, the Green Revolution in México fostered the modernization of other zones of the country, through substantial changes in the irrigation systems and in research, in addition to the development of technological packages made up of seeds, fertilizer and machinery, and was accompanied by a series of credits for agro-industrial development (^{Fujigaki, 2004}).

The Agrarian Reform undertaken since the Cardenismo period also allowed the increase in the production of plots among peasants. With this, the annual productivity of the plots could be increased in more than 3 % and reaching maize production of 1.2 tons per hectare. The Green Revolution program in the northwest allowed the development of dwarf wheat varieties cultivated in irrigated lands. As a result, in the mid-1960s the country achieved self-sufficiency in the production of basic edibles (^{OCDE, 2011}).

However, the development strategy in these years, supported fundamentally by the industry based on the model of import substitution privileged the manufacture of merchandise for urban consumption, above agricultural production, contributing to the polarization of the rural population. From this that it was directed at an emerging agricultural sector, capitalized and financed by subsidy and incentives programs that introduced modern systems of production and agricultural infrastructure for the cultivation of fruits, vegetables and livestock, and directed towards the international market, together with most of the small-scale producers who did not have access to credits and incentives, and whose traditional systems of basic grains, such as maize and bean, were relegated to family consumption. Some authors point out (^{Pichardo, 2006}) that this new strategy had to do with the difficulties found from the lack of organization of most producers, focusing in large entrepreneurial structures of producers or peasants located in irrigation zones or those with good rainfall. The results were their displacement by large agro-industrial corporations and the producers who could not become incorporated had to migrate.

It was during this time that the disarticulation process between agricultural and industrial development began in México, which deepened since 1980 due to the previous macroeconomic imbalances, as well as an unequal development of producers, resulting from the type of property ownership and the technological characteristics of each producer (^{Fujigaki, 2004}). The agricultural policy was centered on the comparative advantages (^{Rubio, 1996}) and deepened the agro-export model under the premise that obtaining earnings and the highest profitability was only possible through large-scale producers, considering the small-scale producers as a hindrance for the sector's development (Ibid). Thus, the fall of international prices of agricultural raw materials and foods allowed the import of some products at lower prices, particularly cereals, which in turn discouraged national agricultural production. In addition, insofar as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the modifications of Constitutional Article 27 did not have the results expected, they did accentuate the crisis in the sector. It was under this scenario that the technological development applied in different areas of agricultural production plays an important role for the sector, since, as has been seen, agriculture has been submerged in a series of deep problems that involve quite diverse aspects. One of them is the process of technological transference, which in the case of México has not been able to establish mechanisms for egalitarian development for all types of producers.

The process of technological transference and innovation

Innovation is a process that results from interactive learning and the accumulation of knowledge, which can take place in various types of social organizations (^{Lundvall, 1992}). Its objective is problem resolution (^{Antonelli, 2000}), and, in the case of the agricultural sector, takes on greater relevance if innovation is related to social needs. Innovation in agriculture is a system that can be defined as a social learning process with multiple actors involved that generate and use new knowledge, and which expands the capacities and opportunities of the poor (^{Berdagué, 2005}).

Technological transference is a process by which knowledge is transmitted, assimilated and adapted from one organizational framework to another in the form of various technologies. This process implies keeping under consideration aspects such as: the characteristics of technology, the type of agents that transmit it, and those who receive it, the cultural context in which this transference is carried out and the possible impact on the market (^{Bozeman, 2000}). Technological transference is more than a simple transit from a set of understandings or know-how of a group of agents towards others; it is a mechanism through which, although understandings and know-how are exchanged, they are influenced by a series of factors that imply the design of technology itself, the instrumental action to reduce the uncertainty of cause-effect relations, the affectation of the cultural surroundings established, the process of appropriation, and the strategy to be carried out. Therefore, transference processes vary due to the type of technology, the agents, cultural practices, local knowledge, social environments, strategies, and industrial sectors.

In the agricultural sector, the mechanisms for technological transference tend to be known rather as "agricultural extension". Such a concept refers not only to the assimilation of various technologies, but rather to practices of training, education and, in general, learning in diverse areas. Therefore, extension work includes technological artifacts, knowledge and practices. Historically, the concept of agricultural extension arose from considering that the systems of agricultural production could improve through interventions by technical experts or researchers with groups of producers by way of courses, workshops and field practices, among others, for the adoption of technology and the implementation of innovation processes. Therefore, agricultural extension was a support, but external to the process itself insofar as it did not involve the producers (^{Alemany and Sevilla, 2006}).

The models of extension work throughout time have been changing according to the characteristics of the producers, of the crops or the government policies; in addition, stemming from the change in the development model that opened the country's economy, the characteristics of markets have evolved from the local to the global. Currently, the agricultural extension models have been developing in a way that agricultural producers are no longer seen only as receptors of knowledge, techniques and technologies, but rather as actors who contribute to giving solutions to their own problems, so it is sought for there to be greater participation and, at the same time, a better internalization process of what is learned and developed. That is, that they participate in the innovation, where the idea of adaptation through knowledge exchange, problem recognition and the search for solutions, is abandoned, where the producers become actors in the innovation processes (^{Sonnino and Ruane, 2013}). However, México is still far from this scheme, since there is not sufficient clarity as to how to implement this type of proposal (^{Herrera Tapia, 2006}).

Policies of agricultural technological transference and innovation in México

Agricultural innovation in México dates from Pre-Hispanic times, since it is center of origin of many of the principal crops in the world. Domestication of maize and bean, among others, has contributed to the global food supply and its genetic diversity continues to be used to improve the crops (^{OCDE, 2011}), at the same time that the country has a broad trajectory in the processes of extension and technological transference. In México, the first service of agricultural extension dates from 1911 with the creation of practical agriculture instructors. In 1920 a mission of agricultural technicians was formed, which travelled the country in trains, providing technical assistance. However, it is starting in 1943 when the Office for Special Studies is established jointly with the Rockefeller Foundation, to improve the cultivation practices in maize, bean and wheat. Since then, we can speak about a group of policies that refer to extension work (^{Muñoz and Santoyo, 2010}). The creation of this office meant adapting part of the North American agricultural extension model, in which research and extension was coordinated by the federal government; through the national institutes of agricultural research, land grant universities, and offices of agricultural agencies in every county, the latter was in charge of providing specialized services to the producers. Thus, the governments in conjunction with the institutes would establish the priorities that would later be transferred to producers, translated into technological strategies. This model has been considered "linear and unidirectional" (^{Aguilar et al., 2010}), given that a hierarchical structure was maintained where the producers were only assimilators of information, and they did not have the opportunity to give feedback to researchers or extension workers, so that the emphasis was placed on the technological offer, rather than on the demand and the producers' needs (^{Jannsen and Ekanayake, 2007}).

Based on the North American example mentioned before, México established a scheme with certain similarities which was based on the resolution of agronomic problems to improve the yields. The Mexican extension scheme integrated a series of characteristics that included research, credit granting, financial insurance, agricultural inputs and harvest purchasing with guarantee prices. Thus, a complete system was articulated to give service to a part of the agricultural sector, supported by a semi-public system for distribution and financing (^{Fujigaki, 2004}). For the Mexican countryside, the Green Revolution project meant an increase in the production of basic foods as a result of the extension of the surface cultivated; thus, in 1960 the total surface devoted to cultivation was 10 061 659 hectares. From these, 83.2 % were rainfed and the remaining 16.8 % irrigation, but five years later the surface increased in 7.8 %. Concerning the annual yields, during that period (1960-1965), an increase of 8.4 % was seen in irrigation lands and 2.4 % in rainfed lands. Although these increases were significant, there was a lower growth in rainfed lands given that that is where small-scale farmers predominate, who, due to their own characteristics² were not benefitted in the same proportion than the large-scale farmers, through mechanisms such as guarantee prices and different subsidies to inputs. One of the defining elements to achieve the incorporation of technology is credit, since it allows the producers to finance themselves during the period of technology insertion. However, and despite the fact that at that time private credit doubled, going from 2327 million pesos to 5897 million, it benefitted mostly large-scale producers and agricultural businesses, excluding the small-scale rural producers, who were benefitted by public credit, which only grew in 11.9 % (^{Hewitt, 1978}). In addition to this, factors such as the increase in fodder crops and the changes in dietary patterns generated a deeper imbalance between producers of basic crops such as maize and bean, in face of large-scale and medium-scale producers.

Despite how complete the model of Mexican agricultural extension seemed, it did not manage to alleviate the main problems that were faced in terms of productivity and, on the contrary, in many cases the differences between producers increased.

In México, the 1982 crisis led to the reduction of public spending, the elimination of subsidies, economic liberalization and deregulation, together with a privatization process of many public companies. All of this had a strong impact on the countryside, since, in addition to the problems already mentioned, the vices, corruption and scarce results generated in all those years came to light when facing a new reality; this because a political spoils system was built, instead of modernizing and increasing the competitiveness of the various types of producers (^{De Grammont and Mackinlay, 2006}).

Since the 1980s new extension models were promoted at the international and national level with the aim of reaching "food security" and under premises such as the reduction of research and governmental supports, and the privatization of some public services, which influenced negatively the access to various types of producers (^{Hu et al., 2012}). Coincidentally with what happened at the international level, agricultural extension programs and supports were cancelled in México due to the closing of the General Direction for Agricultural Promotion and Extension (Dirección General de Promoción y Extensión Agrícola), which transferred part of its activities to the National Agricultural Research Institute (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agrícolas, INIA)³ and to the Irrigation Districts, although when such activities were decentralized they were significantly diluted (Hu et al., 2014).

Stemming from the reforms, the national extension system began to fade when the private extension market was created to support the execution of the government programs at the local level. Thus, resources were channeled now through diverse SAGARPA programs, which in turn hired professional extension agents to provide technical assistance and consulting services. To address this demand, professionals opened offices throughout the country to provide various services, such as identification and preparation of productive projects, technology transfer, and the supply of inputs through various channels both federal and statewide. It is calculated that around six thousand professionals are employed in these activities (^{OCDE, 2011}).

The reformulation of the extension system at the beginning of 1990 was the result of a set of factors, such as the scarcity of basic grains and cereals, droughts, low competitiveness and unemployment in sectors related to agronomy (^{Muñoz and Santoyo, 2010}). This is how in 1995 the National System for Training and Integral Rural Extension (Sistema Nacional de Capacitación y Extensión Rural Integral, SINDER) was created, which was made up of the Training and Extension Program (Programa de Capacitación y Extensión, PCE) and the Elemental Program for Technical Assistance (Programa Elemental de Asistencia Técnica, PEAT). These programs were focused on training and technical assistance and, in general, the activities that were carried out before were developed again. The great difference consisted in that the technicians did not belong to the government payroll anymore; now they were independent professionals who were hired through the producers. The new mechanisms for obtaining resources for agricultural extension projects changed the behavior of all the agents and, above all, they changed the priorities of the technicians themselves, who, when being hired temporarily and based on the project, became "resource managers" for the organizations, often neglecting their primordial activities.

This scheme brought with it for old problems to re-emerge in a new context, since favoritism and the construction of spoils systems were reproduced between organizations, producers' groups, technicians, and state governments. All of this influenced the low capacity to adopt and adapt technical knowledge, and was even more limited for innovation generation.

Since 2001, the agricultural policy and its application have been based on the Law of Sustainable Rural Development, which supports employment in the countryside, the small-scale incorporation and participation of the sector, and gives priority to the marginalized zones and to the weakest sectors in the rural environment. In the areas of research and extension work, the Law delegates their application to SAGARPA, which coordinates the various executing organizations, whose objectives are agricultural research, technology generation, experimentation and extension work.

The new policy for the countryside then entailed reducing the expenditure in the activities related to extension work; in addition, as was mentioned before, the technicians⁴ were decentralized, which led to the formation of the Institute for Rural Training (Instituto de Capacitación Rural, INCA Rural)⁵, whose main function until today has been the design, execution and evaluation of programs for intensive training at the national level, with the objective of contributing to the development of abilities of the providers of professional services, and of all the actors involved with productive projects in the sector (^{INCA, 2014}).

Currently, in México, there is no specific service for agricultural extension. Rather, the farmers have technical assistance when gaining access to different backing programs from SAGARPA as integral part of them. This assistance is received through contractors from the private sector, providers of professional services (PPS), whose function is to fulfill the programs at the level of farm. This program, as was mentioned previously, was a government strategy to create a market for those services, as a response to the abandonment at the beginning of the 1990s from the National Agricultural Extension Direction. The professional services defined for these purposes include strategic planning, project formulation, access to public resources, technical consulting, commercial strategies, training, among others; their objective is to support farmers for their efficiency to increase and facilitate their integration into the value chains (^{OCDE, 2011}).

In addition to programs established through SAGARPA, the National System for Training and Integral Rural Technical Assistance (Sistema Nacional de Capacitación y Asistencia Técnica Rural Integral, SINACATRI) was conformed, which seeks to be a mechanism in the articulation of efforts and resources in training, including public, private and social organizations. This system founded in 2003 establishes the INCA Rural as their executor organ⁶; this means that it is in charge of designing and operating the National Program for Training and Integral Rural Technical Assistance, and, therefore, can establish various coordination agreements with state and municipal governments to carry out rural training broadly⁷ (^{Deschamps and Escamilla, 2010}). According to the analysis carried out by those authors, this system has not had the impact expected due to the null connection with the National Research and Technological Transference System for Sustainable Rural Development (Sistema Nacional de Investigación y Transferencia Tecnológica para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable, SNITT) in the areas of research, validation and technological transference. The SNITT is a consulting organ of the Intersectoral Commission for Sustainable Rural Development (CIDRS) and its objective is to coordinate and set up the actions of public institutions, social and private organizations that promote and perform activities of scientific research, technological development, validation and transference of knowledge in the agricultural and livestock branch (^{SNITT, 2014}). Such as system should be constantly related to the SIINACATRI and to the Innovation Units per product system; however, in practice, quite a low connectivity is perceived between all of them that does not allow generating a strategy in common to solve the problems regarding extension work in general, but particularly in technological transference and innovation. It is important to mention other institutions that directly and indirectly maintain a relationship with the process of technological transference. The first are Trusts Instituted in Relation to Agriculture (Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación a la Agricultura, FIRA), which are in charge of giving grants, guarantees, training, technical assistance and technological transference⁸ (^{FIRA, 2014}). Another important organization is the Trust of Shared Risk (Fideicomiso de Riesgo Compartido, FIRCO), which operates as a specialized agency for promotion of agro-businesses and business incubators, and fosters investment to try to articulate producers, and suppliers of technological services and entrepreneurial development (^{FIRCO, 2014}). This is how FIRA and FIRCO, together with National Financer for Agricultural/Livestock, Rural, Forest and Fishery Development (Financiera Nacional de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Rural, Forestal y Pesquero) (before, Financiera Rural), are the main instruments for training, investment and credit for producers in the sector and are part of the institutional lattice that supports the agricultural sector in México.

Another of the relevant actions related to extension work took place in 1996 when the PRODUCE Foundations were created with the aim of producers participating actively in the definition of problems, needs and priorities for research, in addition to separating financing from research under the scheme of "product system". For authors like ^{Ekboir et al. (2003}), this system is the main institutional innovation, insofar as the objective of the Produce Foundations is, at the same time, to finance research, validate and implement technology transference.

These are constituted at the state level and are organized under the Coordinator of Produce Foundations (Coordinadora de las Fundaciones Produce, COFUPRO); half of their financing corresponds to the state sector and the remainder to the federal. The different foundations try to identify the producers' demands, so as to influence and direct research in the sector. For this purpose, they have a methodology that consists in launching invitations at the state level, in order to finance projects that give solutions to the demands established previously by the different committees of each product system. Therefore, the foundations define part of the research program, defining priorities both for INIFAP and for the other participants, in addition to influencing the allotment of resources from the CONACYT-SAGARPA Sectoral Fund.

The Produce Foundations have been an important mechanism for the organization of demands and for the development of research focused on the solution of specific problems. However, there are a series of weaknesses in the institutional design that should be addressed. One of the problems that the foundations show is the mechanism for establishing the demands, since, although it is true that these are specified thanks to the producers, they have been limited to the far end of the primary production of the chain (^{OCDE, 2011}), which has represented problems to identify the strategic priorities in the medium and long term, given that on many occasions they are adaptive studies and immediate solutions, which does not mean that they are not important, but they do restrict the scope of the research that may be financed. The second problem has to do with the system for project evaluation, since there isn't a mechanism that explains the efficiency and the impact of the project supported, so that the learning process is cut short due to the lack of criticism, feedback and improvement. Finally, there are problems in relation to the mechanisms of technological transference. This is deduced from the analysis that has been carried out during this study through direct observation.

In general terms, these problems respond to a deficient institutional design that is susceptible to being improved since, although the program attempts to establish a strategy in the medium term, it does not manage to crystallize and establish incentives for the innovation because of the distortions that have already been mentioned. According to ^{Aguilar et al. (2010}), Produce Foundations presented and still present a series of deficiencies given the lack of institutional coordination between the Undersecretary Office of Rural Development and the Undersecretary Office of Agriculture, which also affect the state level. In a certain way, the generation process was disconnected from that of technological diffusion, given that the idea permeated that research and development is performed through the Produce Foundations, but that the extension services would transfer them to the producers. This has presented serious problems in practice, given that since there isn't effective coordination between the two areas there is a quite relevant cumulus of research that is not transferred to producers.

The current moment of the extension policy in México

As we mentioned previously, the policies of technological transference or extension have undergone a series of quite diverse organizational changes, albeit at the center of those policies the basic principles of the traditional extension activities are maintained, such as training, technical consulting, demonstrative plots, and some specific services regarding the use of machinery and equipment. Until now a mechanism to promote the active participation of producers in the generation of projects for technological transference and innovation subject to backing has not been established.

The proliferation of offices of Providers of Professional Services (PPS) has been the result of their hire by various organizations, such as peasants' groups, NGOs, and producers' groups, through financing from the SAGARPA support programs, statewide public programs, and the Municipal Councils for Rural Development (Consejos Municipales de Desarrollo Rural, CMDR), to which initiatives from the private and social sectors are added. In every case, hiring of PPS is subsidized totally or in equal parts with public funds. In addition, a group of institutions that range from the federal to the municipal level intervene, making coordination difficult. This is the case, without failing to mention that although INCA Rural is the one in charge of training in general, there are other training and extension programs like FIRA.

All of this is framed and recognized by the federal government itself, in that the agricultural sector in the country is facing a deep crisis as the result of diverse factors such as: smallholding, absence of credit, null management capacity, and lack of connectivity of production with value chains, which affect a vulnerable majority population from the countryside, especially in the communities of high and very high marginalization, as well as in city misery belts (^{SAGARPA, 2014}a). In addition, with regards to technological transference through the rural extension system, it has not managed to improve the technical and technological conditions of the producers, and the fragmentation of the system for technical assistance through support programs is added to this, based on individual projects, where a dispersion of efforts and resources is observed, and a lack of integration from the integration of territorial development and productivity objectives (^{OCDE, 2011}).

Given this context and the diagnoses regarding the inefficiencies and scarcities in the Mexican countryside, a public policy was established in reference to the processes of technological transference and innovation for the agricultural sector, through the Integral Rural Development Program, which is in line with the National Development Plan 2013-2018, stemming from the following reflection⁹:

"the countryside is a strategic sector, because of its potential to reduce poverty and influence regional development, and capitalization of the sector should be strengthened so it is established as one of the five national goals, to have a prosperous México that promotes the sustained growth of productivity in a climate of economic stability and through the generation of equality of opportunities, taking into account that adequate infrastructure and access to strategic inputs foster competition and allow greater capital flows and knowledge towards individuals and companies with the highest potential to take advantage of them, at the time that it seeks to provide favorable conditions for economic development, through a regulation that allows a healthy competition between businesses and the design of a modern policy for economic promotion focused on generating innovation and growth in strategic sectors" (^{Gobierno de México, 2013}).

In such a program, the objective of "building a productive agricultural/livestock/fishing sector that guarantees food security in the country" is established. This objective is sought to be fulfilled through the following strategies: a) fostering productivity in the agri-food sector through investment in the physical, human and technological capital; b) the sustainable exploitation of the country's natural resources; c) association models that generate economies of scale and greater added value for producers in the agri-food sector; d) promoting greater certainty in the agri-food activity through mechanisms of risk management; and e) modernizing the normative and institutional framework to foster a productive and competitive agri-food sector.

These strategies are sought to be fulfilled through 11 components, of which we will only take up again number 6, called Component of Extension and Productive Innovation (Componente de Extensión e Innovación Productiva, CEIP), given the interest of this study which includes five concepts of incentives or what are commonly known as support programs¹⁰. 1) Extension Work in Federal Entities; 2) Gratified Social Service; 3) Integral Programs of Innovation and Extension (Proyectos Integrales de Innovación y Extensión, PIIEX); 4) Correlation with National and Foreign Institutions; and 5) Training and Extension in Agricultural/Livestock Education.

Of these incentives, we will focus on the Integral Programs of Innovation and Extension (PIIEX). It should be mentioned that this program has antecedents in the Integral Training Program (Programa Integral de Capacitación, PIC) 2013, which was one of the most recent attempts at reformulating the agricultural extension schemes in México, so there is certain continuity with some of the elements previously suggested, such as the search for innovating processes.

From goals and objectives to the implementation of public policies

The results that we present here are part of the ongoing research about processes of technological transference and agricultural extension in México. This research includes the follow-up of the implementation of the incentive called Integral Innovation and Extension Projects (Proyectos Integrales de Innovación y Extensión, PIIEX), and, finally, the evaluation of some of the results obtained; for this purpose, the process has been observed, which ranges from the generation of invitations to informational workshops for organizations and beneficiaries and to installation meetings at the national and statewide level, to some other related activities. It should be mentioned that the research process regarding the impact that it has for participants in relation to the activities of technological transference, and regarding the changes generated thanks to their involvement in this type of public policy instrument are still not concluded, so that this study is focused on the first part of the process, which translates into the analysis of the generation itself of the public policy instrument, its implementation, and the factors that intervene.

At the national and statewide level, we reprise the experience of the PIIEX, which had the objective of stimulating social or economic organizations of producers in agricultural, livestock, aquatic and fishing activities in rural and peri-urban zones with the capacity of showing a process of innovation and extension to develop projects that include training, technical assistance, development of capacities, field demonstrations, and others focused on improving their place in the value chains in which they are immersed, strengthening their productivity and competitiveness (^{SAGARPA, 2014}b). This backing or incentive was granted once the presentation of a project based on a methodology established by the SAGARPA itself and the INCA Rural was evaluated positively. However, granting it faced a series of details that are discussed next.

Establishing the components and their respective incentives, as was mentioned previously, depends on the Integral Rural Development Program, where the general guidelines are established, including amounts and evaluation methods. However, for this particular case, it is in the Undersecretary Office of Rural Development, and specifically the General Direction for Capacity Development and Rural Extension Work (Dirección General de Desarrollo de Capacidades y Extensionismo Rural, DGDCER), where the terms for invitations, the objectives and the conditions for each one of them, are discussed and set out. According to our research work, it was confirmed that, although this is a process commanded by the Direction mentioned, different areas of INCA Rural are also involved, since as executing instance they are quite related throughout the process.

The operative path that is followed is the following:

As can be observed, from the generation of the incentive to the launch of the corresponding invitation, there is discussion, feedback, and various agreements are reached; this is not always easy to achieve since there are pressures both at the state and the national level for the invitations to have a profile or for some organizations to be favored. This process is being infiltrated by different types of organizational arrangements, which range from direct lobbying by officers, organization representatives and delegates, to direct pressure through the producers¹¹. As was mentioned before, despite the efforts undertaken to reduce the handout mentality in producers and the old vices of their organizations when facing the State, the problems regarding favoritism and spoils systems still persist.

It should be mentioned that in the PIIEX of national coverage, participation in the incentive is through organizations, which have the ability to group producers, who are known as beneficiaries. This generates a dynamic where organizations struggle to have a large number of beneficiaries among their affiliates and have coverage in various states; this has provoked the existence of a pair of organizations with pressure capacity and very important social mobilization that can affect the evaluation processes, given the connection that they have with various levels of government.

The evaluation process of the projects that are subjected to PIIEX is carried out by INCA Rural, which generates a series of coordination problems that in appearance seem to be solved once the invitation is launched. However, from our perspective, diverse problems take place here, given that, although the instrument can be well established by the DGDCER, there isn't a process through which they agree as to what are the fundamental characteristics for a project to have a positive pronouncement, so that cases may exist where the incentive is granted to organizations that are not aligned to the program's objectives.

As a result of our participation in each one of the stages that involved the launch of invitations, we could verify the following. In terms of the instrument's content, as mechanism to support technological transference, there are advances insofar as the generation of specific projects based on demands is suggested, in which the identification of backing subjects is clearly established, the characterization of market opportunities is proposed, the type of technological transference to which access will be gained, innovations, a strategy with stages and structure, and at least one indicator of results is requested. This represents a significant advancement, given that the organizations and beneficiaries are not accustomed to setting goals in advance and much less to measure their results, which breaks with the dynamics of other programs.

Changing the vision of support programs that are merely handouts towards incentives also represents an advance, given that starting from the formulation of the instrument, the perception of what it means to participate and gain access to the PIIEX seeks to be modified. Another of the important elements is related to the "providers of professional services" (PPS) or all those specialists that offer different extension services to the organizations and beneficiaries, since the amounts that will be paid to each type of extension service are clearly stated, avoiding the inefficient use of resources, but in addition it is suggested that there should be participation of social service providers through the connection with students or recent graduates from careers that may be useful, and this is not restricted to agricultural or livestock areas, but rather it considers economic-administrative areas with the idea that they consider also organizational, financial and commercialization aspects. It should be mentioned that this does not eliminate some of the problems that have already been mentioned; although currently it is sought for the PPS not to be focused on building the project, and with this to become an administrative manager to obtain resources, the problem of quality and training still persists, since many of them do not have the updated knowledge to be able to fulfill their objective, so there are still spaces to improve with regards to this issue.

In spite of the advances there are in the proposal of the program, there are still disconnections from other research systems that may be complementary, such as INIFAP, since, as was mentioned before, there is a cumulus of basic and applied research that is developed through the demands from Produce Foundations, which have not managed to permeate into the majority of the producers; in addition, communication and connection problems with the SNITT still persist. This shows a system that does not allow communication, the generation of joint strategies and objectives to solve the weakest link, which is technological transfer and innovation, resulting to a great extent from the lack of a structured public policy.

Conclusions

The agricultural extension system in the country has evolved through different moments; it has gone from being a state service to one with nearly-private hints. However, there hasn't been an integration process of efforts between the different institutions involved and what can be seen is a disarticulate system whose success and failure depend many times on the regions and the producers' organization, in addition to aspects such as the technicians' performance and the problems that they face around them, like the continuity or the evaluation of results and impact.

On the other hand, in relation to the processes of technological transference and innovation, there have been changes in the extension system that has gone from conceiving the producers as receivers of training to actors who participate by adopting and adapting the technology and other practices, and contributing with their knowledge to giving solutions.

In this sense, the extension system has shown different reformulations, at the beginning as "resource managers" for the support and fulfillment of various government programs, to programs such as PIIEX from SAGARPA, which addressed specific demands from producers, supported by the abilities developed in technology and research from different institutions and actors.

In the particular case of the PIIEX, we consider that they were an attempt to rethink agricultural extension, including the process of technological transference and innovation. However, in both cases the basic problems were not overcome, which have a direct relation with complications in the definition of invitations, rules of operation, and their execution and implementation. There are opportunity areas susceptible of being improved with regards to the program. It is still necessary to clarify aspects such as what technological transference means, as well as technical assistance, training, and what differences there are between each one of them, what steps and stages each one comprises, and what is the finality of each one. It is also necessary to establish standards of quality, minimal elements for a project to be supported, in addition to having to fight for evaluations that are clear and free of political pressures, problems that to a large extent are related to their institutional design, which do not allow the establishment of a framework structured to carry out processes of technological transference and innovation.

In addition to this, we consider that it will not be possible to advance adequately in the establishment of a policy of technological transference for the sector, if the other institutions involved are not appealed to. It is necessary to generate communication ties and shared strategies that allow to establish common objectives and to complement processes. Until today there is a visible disconnection and superposition between the set of actors related to technological transference, which constitutes and barrier to the development of the sector.

Despite the efforts to shape new organizational arrangements, there is not a program that allows giving coherence and coordination between the different support systems, but mostly, an effective mechanism of technological transference towards the producers could not be generated through this program. Therefore, the diverse efforts have been diluted due to the lack of an integral strategy and of continuity that could go beyond the presidential periods or the administrations in office.