Abstract

STIGOL, Nora. Estados mentales, contenidos y conceptos. Diánoia [online]. 2005, vol.50, n.54, pp.55-73. ISSN 0185-2450.

The aim of this paper is to introduce the present debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists in today’s philosophy of mind, in relation to the content of mental states. The debate deals with the issue of the existence of non-conceptual modes of representing the world. The subject under discussion is the non-conceptual features of the contents of certain mental states. The polemic is carried on mainly in three different domains: the one of representative states in creatures lacking conceptual abilities; the one of subpersonal states in information processing, and the one of perceptual experiences. I introduce and discuss the non-conceptual content notion and its legitimacy in these three domains.

Keywords : representation; non-conceptual content; perception; subpersonal states.