Abstract

GONZALEZ BELTRAN, Luis Fernando  and  SANTOYO VELASCO, Carlos. Strategic Behavior in Public-Goods Games: Effect of Contextual Variables. Rev. mex. anál. conducta [online]. 2012, vol.38, n.2, pp.39-53. ISSN 0185-4534.

A public good is a resource from which all individuals may benefit, regardless of whether they helped to provide the good. The individual has an incentive to avoid the cost, but doing so results in worse consequences for each individual, relative to sharing the cost with their group. The present experiment examined this conflict by comparing three general strategies that might describe individual behavior, namely that individuals will: a) behave ''selfishly''; b) be reciprocal; and c) use strategic interactions with a propensity to cooperate, responding to their partners by maintaining or increasing their cooperation. A computer program simulated a public-goods game. Undergraduate students participated in a four-player game, against three dummy players programmed to play according to different levels of cooperation, in four experimental conditions (80, 60, 40 and 20% of the group's contribution). Individual contribution was highest for the lowest group contribution. The particular sequence of experimental conditions had an effect on individual contributions. The variables that affect individual contributions in public-goods games are discussed.

Keywords : cooperation; public-goods game; reciprocity; behavior patterns.