Abstract

VALENCIA ESCAMILLA, Laura. Puntos de veto en la relación Ejecutivo-Legislativo. Sociológica (Méx.) [online]. 2006, vol.21, n.62, pp.43-78. ISSN 2007-8358.

This article shows how political and institutional conditions today both increase structural counterweights and stimulate controversy between the actors to the degree that the probability that the executive approves structural reforms and changes the status quo decreases. The questions that arise are: What are the roles of the executive and the legislature given this new balance of forces? How can cooperation among the parties be achieved in a scenario where the administration has a minority in Congress? To respond, our research will delve into two main areas:1) the impact of veto points on the executive's decision making, and 2) the capacity of institutional design for forging broad coalitions for the approval of bills introduced by the executive.

Keywords : legislative branch; executive branch; veto points; political parties; political pluralism; legislative agenda; divided government.

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