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Tópicos (México)

Print version ISSN 0188-6649

Abstract

ALVARADO MARAMBIO, José Tomás. ¿Confieren poderes causales los universales trascendentes?. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2011, n.40, pp.225-257. ISSN 0188-6649.

This work discusses the so-called 'Eleatic' argument against the existence of transcendent universals, i. e. universals which does not require instantiation for its existence. The Eleatic Principle states that everything produces a difference in the causal powers of something. As transcendent universals seem not to produce such a difference, transcendent universals seem not to exist. The argument depends crucially on the justification and the interpretation of the Eleatic Principle. It is argued, first, that it is not very clear that the principle is justified, and, second, that there are several alternatives for its interpretation, in relation with the different theories one can endorse about modality or causality. Anti-realist theories of modality or causality are not very appropriate for the understanding of what should be a 'causal power'. Neither does a realist theory of causality conjoined with a combinatorial theory of possible worlds. A 'causal power' seems to be better understood in connection with a realist -non-reductionist- theory of causality and a causal theory of modality. Taken in this way the Eleatic Principle, nonetheless, it is argued that transcendent universals do 'produce' a difference in causal powers, for every causal connection requires such universals for its existence.

Keywords : Eleatic Argument; Universals; Causal Powers; Armstrong; Modality; Causality.

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