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Tópicos (México)

Print version ISSN 0188-6649

Abstract

DOBRE, Catalina Elena. The reconstruction of philosophy through the subjective doubt and repetition in Soren Kierkegaard's De omnibus dubitandum est. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2014, n.47, pp.25-52. ISSN 0188-6649.

The point of departure of this article is Kierkegaard's critic of the objective doubt, as it is exposed by the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus in De omnibus dubitandum est. Kierkegaard reconstructs the meaning of philosophy through the idea of subjective doubt and repetition as fundamental concepts of the new philosophy. In this sense, first we analyze what means subjective doubt, subjective consciousness and repetition to argue that for Kierkegaard doubt cannot be limited to a logical and universal process of thought, but it's related with individual consciousness and imply contradiction, anxiety and faith. Secondly we will try to emphasize the relationship between subjective consciousness, doubt and repetition, to argue that doubt reflects an existential way of being because it's the manifestation of the subjective conciousness, and that is why philosophy, for Kierkegaard, it's impossible without a subjective thinker and a subjective doubt. For a better understanding of all these concepts we will also use other Kierkegaard's writings as Philosophical Fragments, Repetition, Fear and Trembling and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

Keywords : doubt; consciousness; repetition; faith; philosophy.

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