Abstract

VIDAL, Javier. An Explanation of Psychological Self-Knowledge. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2018, n.54, pp.353-392. ISSN 0188-6649.  https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i54.858.

Following С. Peacocke's approach, I will develop an expia-nation of psychological self-knowledge in terms of the states and contents involved in the transition from a conscious mental state to a higher-order judgement. Now, it seems that the mere awareness of a mental state does not explicitly represent or in any way manifest the subject of that state, in which case it poses an à la Lichtenberg challenge to Peacocke's explanation. After embracing a self-representational theory of the subjective character of experience, I will argue that the representation through which a conscious experience represents itself as itself has an implicit de se content. Thus it is an explanation which precludes an à la Lichtenberg challenge because the use of the first-person in a higher-order judgement turns out to be content-dependent.

Keywords : psychological self-knowledge; subjective character of experience; implicit de se content; semantic relativism; self-representational theory of consciousness.