Abstract

SANCHEZ CETINA, José Antonio. Line 12: A Classic Blame Game. Gest. polít. pública [online]. 2018, vol.27, n.3, pp.253-280.  Epub Oct 16, 2020. ISSN 1405-1079.  https://doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v27i3.452.

Transportation projects in big cities imply a complexity as big as the same cities. Implementing subway systems and projects requires several analyses, plans and contracts of different nature, as well as the coordinated collaboration of officers and public and private institutions who are seeking to maximize the visibility that a successful project attracts. Nevertheless, when significant failures force the system to interrupt the operation on the line and emphasize the need of important corrections, a peculiar phenomenon called blame game comes to action. This article studies the different strategies used by the most important actors on the Mexico City’s Line twelve case from the blame game and blame avoidance framework.

Keywords : transportation policies; policy fiasco; organizational theory; organizational behavior; blame game.