Abstract

ESLAVA, Marcela. Ciclos políticos de la política fiscal con votantes opuestos al déficit. El caso colombiano. El trimestre econ [online]. 2006, vol.73, n.290, pp.289-336.  Epub Dec 02, 2022. ISSN 2448-718X.  https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v73i290.546.

Theoretical models of the political bud get cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and ex tent of this manipulation de pend on the fiscal preferences of voters. These insights, however, are often overlooked in empirical studies. In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and election out comes in Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the pre-electoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish in cumbents who run high deficits before the election.

Keywords : ciclos políticos del presupuesto; elecciones; Colombia; gastos y presupuestos municipales.

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