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El trimestre económico

On-line version ISSN 2448-718XPrint version ISSN 0041-3011

Abstract

SANCHEZ MIER, Luis. Grupos de interés y reforma comercial en México. El trimestre econ [online]. 2006, vol.73, n.290, pp.337-361.  Epub Nov 11, 2022. ISSN 2448-718X.  https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v73i290.547.

Mexico experienced widespread economic reform in the last two decades. From being a protectionist economy with a policy of import substitution, it has turned into an export-oriented open economy. Why was protectionism a stable policy, and how was it overturned by a reform that went against entrenched interests? I apply a game theoretic model of political influence and economic reform to answer these questions using data to calculate the payoffs for the relevant interest groups. In the underlying cooperative game, the core is empty and a protectionist coalition of import-substituting firms and the government was “stable” until the eighties. Adjusting the model’s parameters to changes in the government’s financing options in the late eighties and early nineties leads to a different and unique outcome. In the predicted out come a free trade policy is adopted through cooperation between all players.

Keywords : reforma comercial; México; formación de coalición; aspiraciones; juegos cooperativos; grupos de interés.

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