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Computación y Sistemas
versión On-line ISSN 2007-9737versión impresa ISSN 1405-5546
Resumen
ALVARADO, Matías; YEE RENDON, Arturo y COCHO, Germinal. Simulation of Baseball Gaming by Cooperation and Non-Cooperation Strategies. Comp. y Sist. [online]. 2014, vol.18, n.4, pp.693-708. ISSN 2007-9737. https://doi.org/10.13053/CyS-18-4-1987.
Baseball is a top strategic collective game that challenges the team manager's decision-making. A classic Nash equilibrium applies for non-cooperative games, while a Kantian equilibrium applies for cooperative ones. We use both Nash equilibrium (NE) and Kantian equilibrium (KE), separate or in combination, for the team selection of strategies during a baseball match: as soon as the selection of strategies by NE or KE carries a team to stay match loosing, a change to KE or NE is introduced. From this variation of selection of strategies the team that is losing tends to close or overcome the score with respect to the team with advantage according to the results from computer simulations. Hence, combining Nash selfish-gaming strategies with Kantian collaboration-gaming strategies, a baseball team performance is strengthened.
Palabras llave : Baseball strategies; cooperation and non-cooperation; Nash equilibrium; Kantian equilibrium; computer simulations.