Resumen

RAMOS-UMANA, Leonardo. Prohairesis in Epictetus. Nova tellus [online]. 2022, vol.40, n.2, pp.53-82.  Epub 29-Ago-2022. ISSN 0185-3058.  https://doi.org/10.19130/iifl.nt.2022.40.2.0021x53.

The purpose of this article is to explain what prohairesis is in the philosophy of Epictetus, for which we will collect its main features, namely, (I) that the achievement of happiness (or the achievement of virtue) depends entirely on the use we give to our prohairesis, and (II) that prohairesis is the highest thing among all which belong to human being. So three complex questions need to be addressed: (1) How does prohairesis relate to the rational faculty (δύναμις λογική)?, (2) How does prohairesis relate to the faculty that uses representations (ἡ χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις)? And, last but not least, (3) How does prohairesis relate to the ruling part of the soul (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν)? According a comparative reading of several key passages, in this article we show that only the first two questions are answered by an identity relationship. About the third question, we argue that prohairesis is a faculty belonging to hēgemonikón, a conclusion that turns away from common postures in specialized literature.

Palabras llave : precedent; hēgemonikón; Stoic theory of action; what depends on us; eph’ hēmîn.