Resumen

PONCE RODRIGUEZ, Raúl Alberto  y  RODRIGUEZ HERNANDEZ, Alan Adrián. Electoral systems and their influence on environmental policy design. Prob. Des [online]. 2020, vol.51, n.203, pp.137-166.  Epub 11-Ene-2021. ISSN 0301-7036.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iiec.20078951e.2020.203.69499.

This article undertakes a comparative analysis of the respective effects of majority and proportional representation electoral systems on tax policies designed to reduce pollution. The following findings were obtained: in a majority electoral system, environmental regulation is extreme with very low or high taxes compared to a socially optimal policy; in a proportional representation system, environmental policy is moderate (taxes are moderate compared to taxes implemented in a majority system); and environmental policy in proportional representation systems more closely resembles a socially optimal policy. Electoral institutions account for these findings, which are due to the number of effective parties and legislative negotiation in Congress.

Palabras llave : pollution; taxes; environmental policy; regulation; theoretical model; electoral system; democracy.

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