Resumen

MANRIQUE PEREZ, María Laura. Acción, conocimiento y dolo eventual. Isonomía [online]. 2009, n.31, pp.177-201. ISSN 1405-0218.

In this paper the author points out some problems that stem from the connection between contemporary theories in criminal law about dolus eventualis, and our paradigmatic conception of action, i.e. the so called Humean theory. These problems are of two classes: internal and external ones. On the one hand, the author shows that reductionist theories are not able to provide a sound criterion for distinguishing between dolus eventual'isand conscious negligence. If reductionist theories are rejected, dolus eventualis can not be regarded as a genuine form of dolus. In order to overcome this problem, criminalists often replace a descriptive point of view on the actual motivation of agents for an adscriptive (normative) conception of dolus, but this shift separates dolus from agents' mental states that determine their actions. As a consequence of this conceptual movement, differences between subjective and objective responsibility actually vanish. On the other hand, the author shows that contemporary theories challenge the conceptual priority of the explanation of actions over their evaluation. Thus, these theories make agents responsible on account of the consequences of their actions rather than by their actions.

Palabras llave : dolus eventualis; knowledge; humean action.