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Norteamérica
versión On-line ISSN 2448-7228versión impresa ISSN 1870-3550
Resumen
REICH, Simon y ASPINWALL, Mark. The Paradox of Unilateralism: Institutionalizing Failure In U.S.-Mexican Drug Strategies. Norteamérica [online]. 2013, vol.8, n.2, pp.7-39. ISSN 2448-7228.
Realism posits that strong states use compulsory power to influence the behavior of weaker ones. If true, then U.S. policy toward Mexico on a key national security issue such as drugs should illustrate that claim and policy outcomes should reflect U.S. preferences. Yet, in exploring a series of bilateral case studies, this article suggests that unilateral U.S. government initiatives do not achieve their specified goals. Rather, we argue that Mexico effectively employs a series of "strangulation strategies." These derail U.S. initiatives and -under specific conditions- result in institutional agreements that proscribe certain forms of behavior and reduce future U.S. autonomy.
Palabras llave : drugs; autonomy; institutionalism; unilateralism; bilateralism; strangulation strategies; United States; Mexico.