Resumen

LEE, Geoffrey. Against magnitude realism. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2023, vol.55, n.163, pp.13-44.  Epub 04-Jun-2024. ISSN 0011-1503.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1407.

In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate.

Palabras llave : magnitudes; grounding; reductionism; realism; relationism.