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Estudios Económicos (México, D.F.)
versión On-line ISSN 0186-7202versión impresa ISSN 0188-6916
Resumen
SANCHEZ PEREZ, Joss Erick. An elementary transfers procedure for sharing the joint surplus in games with externalities. Estud. Econ. (México, D.F.) [online]. 2023, vol.38, n.2, pp.317-332. Epub 26-Ene-2024. ISSN 0186-7202. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v38i2.445.
Sánchez-Pérez (2017, Theorem 3) presents an analytic characterization for all solutions for games with externalities that satisfy the axioms of linearity, symmetry, and efficiency. The main goal of this paper is to recast such formulation to a more intuitive interpretation. In particular, we are interested in an interpretation based on the idea of transfers among players.
Palabras llave : games with externalities; axiomatic solution; transfers procedure.