SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
 número50Un caso de antiaristotelismo agustiniano: Lutero y la recepción de Aristóteles en la Reforma protestanteEl proyecto matemático de la naturaleza en la filosofía heideggeriana del período de Marburgo (1923-1927) índice de autoresíndice de materiabúsqueda de artículos
Home Pagelista alfabética de revistas  

Servicios Personalizados

Revista

Articulo

Indicadores

Links relacionados

  • No hay artículos similaresSimilares en SciELO

Compartir


Tópicos (México)

versión impresa ISSN 0188-6649

Resumen

HILLER, Fernando Rudy. The Deductions of Freedom/Morality-as-Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III and Their Problems. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2016, n.50, pp.61-94. ISSN 0188-6649.

The first objective of this paper is to present an interpretation of Groundwork III which aims to establish two main points: first, that Kant offers there a theoretically-grounded deduction (in a Kantian sense) of freedom/morality-as-autonomy; second, that Kant also offers a separate deduction of the categorical imperative. Thus, contrary to what several commentators have claimed, Groundwork III contains a theoretically-grounded double deduction. The second objective of the paper is to examine and criticize in detail one crucial step in these deductions, namely, Kant's inference from the speculative spontaneity of reason to the noumenal existence of the subject as a free will. I show that Kant himself came to reject this inference in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and argue that this explains Kant's rejection, in the Critique of Practical Reason, of the deduction of the moral law he previously offered. Thus, contrary to the "reconciliationist" reading, there is indeed a great reversal in the latter work.

Palabras llave : Groundwork; Kant; deduction; moral law; fact of reason.

        · resumen en Español     · texto en Inglés     · Inglés ( pdf )

 

Creative Commons License Todo el contenido de esta revista, excepto dónde está identificado, está bajo una Licencia Creative Commons