Resumen

NAPOLI S., Enzo  y  NAVIA, Patricio. Success on Second Try: Mining Royally in 2004 and Specific Tax on Large-Scale Mining in 2005 in Chile. Gest. polít. pública [online]. 2012, vol.21, n.1, pp.141-183. ISSN 1405-1079.

The final outcome of a legislative initiative is explained by institutional and extra-institutional variables. In the Chilean presidential system, the executive power to set and influence the legislative agenda is checked by congressional powers and attributions to approve or reject such initiatives. Checks and balance provision in the political system induce intertemporal agreements between coalitions. The electoral calendar and public opinion interest on a given initiative also influence legislative approval. The success of an initiative depends on the actors' ability to establish intertemporal agreements and on political and electoral variables that hinder or foster the development and enforcement of such agreements. Using the legislative debate over two consecutive proposals to tax mining during the Lagos administration (2000-2006), a royalty and a specific tax on large mining projects, we study the institutional power structure of executive-legislative relations in Chile and the extra-institutional variables that induce the executive to send legislative initiatives doomed to be rejected. By analyzing the entire legislative process, including congressional committee debates, of the two projects, the royalty tax in 2004 and the large mining tax in 2005, we assess the effect of short-term political variables and the electoral calendar over the behavior and strategies of the executive and legislative powers.

Palabras llave : Executive-Legislative relations; checks and balances; politics of public policies.