Resumen

MANUELL CID, Gerardo  y  MONTIEL, Luis V.. Maximum Probability Negotiations in Cooperative Games with Commercial Purposes. Rev. mex. econ. finanz [online]. 2019, vol.14, n.2, pp.245-259.  Epub 13-Dic-2018. ISSN 2448-6795.  https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v14i2.382.

This work presents a method to find the payment strategy that maximizes the probability of closing a negotiation in cooperative scenarios of transferable utility for commercial purposes. This procedure uses a simulation tool called JDSIM to sample the core of the game and generate cumulative empirical probability functions of the payments of each actor in order to establish the negotiation that maximizes the product of these functions. This method is compared with other two methods already established in the literature, called Shapley Value (SV) and the centroid of the Core, through thirty random scenarios and a practical case in which it is observed that this always offers unique and implementable solutions, and provides a rational justification unlike those already mentioned. It should be borne in mind that this work is only intended to resolve negotiations in which the distribution of payments allows all actors to unite in a single coalition; however, the paradigm presented can be adapted to smaller sub-coalitions to extend its scope. This solution proposes a better alternative to those found in the literature and represents an important advance in areas of negotiation and game theory.

Palabras llave : Negotiation; Shapley Value; Core; JDSIM; Game simulation; C44; C71.

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