Resumen

PRIEL, Dan. Jurisprudential Disagreements and Descriptivism. Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho [online]. 2014, n.8, pp.483-518. ISSN 2448-7937.

Many contemporary legal philosophers argue that general jurisprudence is "descriptive." I challenge this view in this essay by focusing on one familiar aspect of jurisprudence: persistent disagreements among legal philosophers. I argue that this fact is in tension with the claim that jurisprudence is descriptive. I consider several possible reconciliations of jurisprudential disagreements with descriptivism, but I argue that none of them succeeds. I then argue that persistent jurisprudential disagreements are easy to explain from within a normative framework. I conclude by suggesting that legal philosophers abandon descriptivism in favor of a view that more explicitly sees legal philosophy as part of normative political philosophy.

Palabras llave : Legal Theory; Jurisprudential Disagreements; Descriptivism; Normative Political Philosophy; Legal Methodology.