Resumen

LARIOS FERRER, José Leonel. Decision power of political parties in the LXIII and LXIV Mexican Legislatures: an analysis with game theory and simulations. Inter disciplina [online]. 2024, vol.12, n.32, pp.245-276.  Epub 15-Mar-2024. ISSN 2448-5705.  https://doi.org/10.22201/ceiich.24485705e.2024.32.87013.

Decisions made in different congresses are of great importance for the social and economic sphere of a country, since without cooperation between parties, the approval of reforms and laws can be stalled. The way in which decision-making’s power dynamics between the different political forces is studied can be approached from a quantitative point of view. That is why in the present investigation the decision-making power of political parties in the LXIII and LXIV Legislatures is analyzed through different indices offered by cooperative game theory and through simulations developed in Scilab. The importance of studying this type of topics from an interdisciplinary approach lies in the better understanding of political behavior within congresses, and in the knowledge of the multiple ways that can be had to approve the different agreements. It is found that in three years MORENA increased its decision-making power by more than 60% and the PRI has lost almost 50% of it. It was also possible to verify that the PRI is the party that benefits the most from making coalitions and that the PAN is the most harmed in this type of analysis.

Palabras llave : theory of games; power indexes; coalitional value; political parties of Mexico; Chamber of Deputies of Mexico; decision power; simulations in Scilab.

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