Resumen

BALASKO, Yves. Las privatizaciones y la eficiencia a largo plazo. El trimestre econ [online]. 2006, vol.73, n.289, pp.5-21.  Epub 07-Feb-2023. ISSN 2448-718X.  https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v73i289.551.

The Viner-Wong envelope theorem tells us that at optimum capacity, long-run and short-run marginal costs are equal. This theorem implies that the combination of long-run optimal capacity with short-run competitive behavior generates long-run efficiency. This property underlies many privatization schemes of the past two decades. We explore the robustness of this long-run efficiency property by extending the Viner-Wong partial equilibrium setup to a simple general equilibrium one. We show that long-run efficiency then fails to be true because the short-run model may feature multiple short-run equilibria that are all except one long-run inefficient. Therefore, it is necessary to supplement optimal capacity and short-run competitive behavior by a cap on the remuneration rate of the firm's capital input so that the latter does not significantly exceed the remuneration of comparably risky as sets.