Resumen

FERNANDEZ RUIZ, Jorge. Un oligopolio mixto con contratación endógena de administradores y titularidad privada nacional y extranjera. El trimestre econ [online]. 2010, vol.77, n.308, pp.831-852. ISSN 2448-718X.

This paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly in which firms may hire managers and delegate their decisions to them for strategic reasons. Unlike previous research, we examine the case in which a public firm competes with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, both of them private. We show that these two private firms behave differently. In equilibrium, only the domestic firm strategically hires a manager that deviates from simple profit maximization. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when none of the firms hires a manager and that resulting from the competition of a domestic and a foreign firm run by managers.

Palabras llave : oligopolio mixto; empresa pública; empresa extranjera; contratos de incentivos de administradores.