Resumen

PONCE RODRIGUEZ, Raúl Alberto. Efectos de las fórmulas para las transferencias inter-gubernamentales en el tamaño del gobierno federal. EconoQuantum [online]. 2013, vol.10, n.1, pp.37-58. ISSN 2007-9869.

In this paper, we study the role of inter-regional externalities of public goods, equity and electoral competition in the determination of the budget of the central government that funds the provision of local public goods.          Our model predicts that the budget for local public goods is proportional to a weighted average of the nation's income and inversely proportional to a weighted average of the nation's taxes; that the electoral competition induces policy makers to select a budget for the central government that is Pareto efficient. This result is different to the prediction of other models of political economy, such as the median voter and the Leviathan models, in which fiscal policy is Pareto inefficient. Finally, in this article, we provide hypotheses that can be verified empirically by identifying configurations of the distribution of income, population and the determination of the formula for inter-governmental transfers that can induce a higher (lower) level of spending from the central government to finance local public goods.

Palabras llave : Transferencias inter-gubernamentales; el tamaño del gobierno; la competencia electoral.

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