Resumen

CASTILLO SOTO, Manuel  y  MENDOZA GARCIA, Jorge. Basic algorithms for second-degree pricing discrimination. Anál. econ. [online]. 2018, vol.33, n.84, pp.77-98. ISSN 2448-6655.

Traditionally, the companies have focused on the strategy development for the creation of value; while the value capture mechanisms, better known as pricing schemes, have been lagging behind these. In this paper, we insist that “smart” pricing strategies are not exactly a zero-sum game. Plenty of examples show that it is possible to formulate price policies, which benefit suppliers as much as consumers.

As it is known, the policy of price discrimination has the purpose of serving several segments of consumers, delivering the same or almost the same good but at a different price, depending on the type of consumer or segment addressed. In this paper, we review one of the price discrimination variations, called second-degree discrimination. In particular, we focus on the study of simple algorithms, but the ones which allow understand and design optimal mechanisms to set prices, which benefit the two market agents. The assumptions under which algorithms mentioned are built are strict, but we believe that it is an excellent approximation to understand the behavior and nature of both the bidder and the claimant before and during economic transactions.

Palabras llave : Pricing; price discrimination; consumer surplus; reservation price; block pricing; two part tariff; pricing strategy; DOI; DII; EI3; LII.