2.1. The source of political authority

Clearly, the CSDC affirms that all authority comes from God, because it belongs to Him, the Creator who governs the whole universe and everything in it. Thus, all political authority is not absolute in itself, because it must refer to a higher authority, that of God.

However, this reference to divinity is totally absent from the FC. Indeed, in the introduction to the DDHC, we read that “the National Assembly recognizes and declares, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of Man and of the Citizen.” G. Carcassonne et al. comment on this reference to the Supreme Being as a “prudent formulation that respects the Christian faith, satisfies the prevailing deism, does not insult possible atheism and, incidentally, gives the Declaration the necessary sacredness” ^{(4, p. 429)}. On the other hand, M.A. Fontelle sees in this reference an explicit attempt to destroy “one of the fundamental laws of the Ancient Régime, in such a way that the promulgation of this Declaration condemned the immediate disappearance of the Monarchy and the Church” ^{(5, p. 324)}.

On the one hand, there is the God of Christianity; on the other, there is the Supreme Being of the Enlightenment. The former refers to a divinity, the latter to natural religion based primarily on human reason and philosophical individualism. Two conceptions of the source of authority fuel this tension between the religious and civil realms in the assessment of bioethical legislation.

In this context, personalist bioethics proposes a reconciliation between the two conceptions. It refers to natural law as the source of political authority. Indeed, personalist bioethics specifies that natural law is the moral law “inherent in man’s conscience, innately identifiable at the first level of his consciousness, and thereafter being a rational norm [...] It is a universal and immutable law, just like human nature itself” ^{(6, p. 148)}.

This solution has its origins in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, based on Aristotelian philosophy. Thomas Aquinas states that natural law is the expression of natural inclinations in the form of general, unquestionable precepts. By “natural”, he refers to that which is linked to the reasonable nature of the human being, and is therefore universal ^{(7, q. 90 -91)}; by “inclination”, he means this “instinct of reason” (instinctus rationis) ^{(7, q. 68, a. 2)}, the basis of every human act. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes five natural inclinations: the good, the preservation of being, the knowledge of truth, life in society and sexuality ^{(7, q. 94, a. 2}; ^{8, pp. 410-414)}. By transposing these five inclinations onto the personalist model, we can affirm that the good corresponds to fundamental rights, the preservation of being corresponds to respect for life, knowledge of the truth corresponds to the truth linked to conscience, life in society corresponds to the principle of sociality and subsidiarity and sexuality corresponds to conjugal life between man and woman and all that follows from it ^{(6, p. 170)},

If political authority draws its power from this natural law, a balance is struck between the rational aspect (Enlightenment philosophy) and the Christian aspect, for whom natural law is a reflection of divine law ^{(7, q. 91, a. 4)}. In both, the human person is at the center of their reflections.

2.2. The object of political authority

The human person has and must always occupy a central place in political discourse, since it is the foundation and the end of every political community. In the SDC, as in the FC, the human person is not just a matter for the citizens of a particular country, or for the individuals of a particular ethnic group. The introduction to the DDHC is understood as a universal vocation, which is of course the case in the SDC, since the human person is characterized by a proper nature [1.2.1] and by a dignity [1.2.2] that must be safeguarded from all penalties [1.2.3].

3.1 Freedom (liberty)

Freedom, a universal value, is linked to truth, justice and charity (CSDC 138-143, 198-208, 384). It derives from the natural law and is situated in the practice of goodness and love since, as “the principal characteristic of the intelligence and the will, it is a precious gift of God to man” ^{(5, p. 307)}. According to the CSDC, freedom does not simply consist in doing this or doing that: according to Thomistic thought, on which Christian morality is based, every human act is not free by nature, but is ordered to an end ^{(5, pp. 302-320)}. Otherwise, it would have no meaning and its morality could not be assessed.

For its part, art. 6 of the DDHC affirms that “freedom consists in being able to do everything that does not harm others”. This is a clear reference to the Kantian conception of individual freedom, which is limited only by the freedom of others. But who defines the freedom of others and the limits that must not be crossed? What are the rules for determining the forbidden zone and giving everyone the opportunity to enjoy their own freedom?

These questions depend on the type of freedom involved. Among the fundamental freedoms cited by the CSDC are freedom of conscience [2.1.1], freedom of expression [2.2.2] and religious freedom [2.2.3].

3.2. Equality

If dignity is the basis of equality between human beings, the CSDC (389) affirms that the political community must work for the common good in order to create an environment where all citizens are equal, particularly in the “effective exercise of human rights”.

In a similar context, the CF contains several references to the principle of equality. Art. 1 of the DDHC refers to this principle in general terms. In the first paragraphs of the CP, the principle of equality refers to non-discrimination, art. 3 to equality between women and men, and art. 11 to equality in the protection of health.

Whereas the principle of equality in the CSDC is rooted in ontologically grounded dignity, in the FC this equality is evoked rather from a legal standpoint: equal before the law. Two applications of this principle require our attention.

It is in this spirit that personalist bioethics considers that the principle of equality must be based, on the one hand, on the two notions of natural law and the justice attached to this law ⁽²⁸⁾ and, on the other, on the principle of the unity¹¹ and the totality of the person, in order to avoid an ontological rupture and any ethical relativism ^{(6, pp. 107-133, 399-442, 582-585)}. In this sense, equality cannot be approached as being mathematical or arithmetical in nature, based on a quantitative distribution of rights. Otherwise, law itself, in the name of some subjectivity, destroys the foundations of the protection of the common good as an objective good ^{(28, pp. 9-13, 287288, 304, 315-316)}.

3.3. Fraternity

This principle is expressed through the two principles of solidarity and subsidiarity (CSDC 417-418). These are based on justice (CSDC 391), which enables everyone to enjoy their property and rights. However, the interpretation of paragraph 12 of the PC refers rather to “budgetary law for expenditure and fiscal law for revenue” ^{(4, p. 458)}, to create a certain social justice or equity, particularly when it comes to national calamities. Solidarity, which aims to build human society ^{(5, pp. 403-407)}, is more a matter of friendship, disinterestedness and gratuitousness (CSDC 390-391), not only when it comes to disasters, but also when it comes to any attack on a person, a group of people or even society as a whole. Solidarity is also a matter of subsidiarity, embodied in voluntary action and cooperation (CSDC 419-420).

Moreover, fraternity is a principle of constitutional value (FC art. 2). In particular, it is considered in the light of the freedom to provide humanitarian aid to others ^{(11, pp. 519-520)}.

E. Sgreccia refers instead to the principle of sociality and subsidiarity, far from any social humanism. Sociality consists in the fact that an individual considers his or her life not only as a personal good, but also as a social good, since the human being is a social being by nature. This is reflected, for example, in the willingness to help others through organ or tissue donation. As for subsidiarity, personalist bioethics agrees with the CSDC and the CF that the community should “give more help where it is most needed” ^{(6, pp. 170-171)}. In reality, however, this is often not the case. For example, how can we justify covering the full cost of ART or abortion -for non-medical necessity- when a consultation with a cardiologist is only covered “at 70% with a medical prescription or with a coordinated care plan, without which it is only at 30%” ⁽²⁹⁾?

In this context, Pope Francis declares that:

Fraternity is not merely the result of conditions of respect for individual freedoms, or even of a certain observed fairness. Although these are presuppositions that make it possible, they are not enough for it to emerge as an inevitable result. Fraternity has something positive to offer freedom and equality ^{(30, § 103)}.

This statement by Pope Francis, and before him the whole of the SDC, is a warning against the individualism clearly found in the CF, an individualism that does not “make us freer, more equal, more brothers” ^{(30, § 105)}. These three principles - liberty, equality and fraternity - are therefore intended to protect man’s natural rights. But which rights are they?

3.4. Human Rights

The question of human rights is central and is linked to that of the individual. It is important to clarify two ideas.

Of course, to enumerate all rights, the list could be long. But there are four natural and imprescriptible fundamental rights that must be preserved by every political association, according to art. 2 of the DDHC and the SDC ^{(5, pp. 713-715)}. Two of these rights are common: property and liberty. For this second right, the SDC insists on religious freedom. As for the other two, the DDHC mentions the right to security and the right to resist oppression. The latter is one of the rights cited by the SDC not as a fundamental right, but as a means to be used as a last resort in the event of “certain, serious and prolonged violations of fundamental rights” (CSDC 400-401). The two other natural and fundamental rights specific to the SDC are the right to work, considered a duty by paragraph 5 of the PC, and the right to life, which is nowhere to be found in the FC, the DDHC or the PC (with one exception, and without any explicit reference, in art. 66-1 of the FC, where the abolition of the death penalty is invoked). This is one of the reasons why “the Popes do not refer to the Declaration of 1789 but to that of 1948, since it tends to express the natural law” ^{(5, p. 329)}.

What’s astonishing is that the right to life, as the main fundamental right that undergoes the various bioethical issues, is completely absent from the CF. It touches on two main issues: a) abortion and the right to life of the unborn child, and b) euthanasia and the duty not to commit an act of murder. In this context, the fundamental freedom supported by the CF may seem surprising when we fail to recognize that life is the fundamental value of all others.

Hence E. Sgreccia indicates that “to be free, one must be alive” ^{(6, p. 167)}, since freedom presupposes the life it expresses and from which it draws its source ^{(6, p. 144)}.

The relationship between political authority and the people is based on these natural rights.

4.1. Power participation

“The subject of political authority is the people. It is they who transfer power to elected representatives and “retain the power to assert it” (CSDC 395). There is no doubt that the French Republic affirms this principle. Article 2 of the Constitution states that “its principle is: government of the people, by the people and for the people”; and article 3 affirms that “national sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it through their representatives”. This already defines the characteristics of France: it is a Republic, as opposed to the Monarchy abolished in 1789, and it is a representative democracy whose power is held by the people. The CSDC specifies that “democracy is a ‘system’ and, as such, an instrument and not an end” (CSDC 407). This clarifies the basis for the exercise of power.

If power belongs to the people, it can only be applied through concrete instruments, including representation by elected representatives (CSDC 408-409; FC art. 3) and referendum (CSDC 413; FC art. 3, 11 and 89).

The CSDC adds a third instrument: political parties, which offer “citizens the effective possibility of contributing to the formation of political choices” (CSDC 413). However, even if they “contribute to the expression of suffrage” (FC, art. 4), they have no “real status” and their role “is rather contrasted”, especially when a party “finds its place all the better when it defines it in relation to a president or a presidential candidate” ^{(4, pp. 55-56)}.

In such a system, the issue of biopower is expressed by Pope Benedict XVI. He affirms that there is a risk of the exercise of a certain “tyranny” of the majority by political authority, especially when “the dignity of man and humanity” are at stake ⁽³¹⁾. The government’s dependence on a political party carries the latter’s electoral program. And in the event that this program undermines human principles, values and rights as the Church understands them, the entire people will suffer the consequences, with the legislation of laws that run counter to morality. Law no. 2021-1017 of August 2, 2021 on bioethics ⁽¹⁾” is a case in point. The lack of consensus between the National Assembly and the Senate on the draft law prompted the government to invoke art. 45 of the Constitution, which confers the right of “final say” on the National Assembly. This gives the National Assembly the right to make final decisions on legislation, without taking into account the opinions of the Senate. Another example currently in play is the plan to guarantee the right to abortion by enshrining it in the Constitution ⁽³²⁾.

Hence the importance for the Church of continuing to defend the fundamental values and principles that concern the protection of human life. However, secularism could be an obstacle to this mission.

4.2. Secularism

Since the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State, the relationship between the two protagonists has often been unstable. While this separation was intended to ensure autonomy and independence, collaboration between these two institutions is tending to disappear, particularly in the context of bioethics.

Certainly, the Church’s primary role is to “satisfy the spiritual demands of its faithful”, which is part of the spiritual order; it must respect the “legitimate autonomy of the democratic order” (CSDC 424), itself part of the temporal order. It is in this sense that F. Daguet and G. Cottier do not hesitate to assert that while “the temporal domain is that in which justice must reign, the spiritual domain concerns the exercise of the theological virtues, and the latter neither absorbs nor suppresses the former” ^{(33, p. 136)}. However, this autonomy does not mean total separation. Indeed, “insofar as the Church’s so-called social doctrine [...] deals with wage-earning, enterprise and property, it is a fact that it is situated on the temporal plane” ^{(34, p. 60).}

Moreover, from the very first words of art. 1 of the FC, we can see that France is presented as a secular republic with a dimension of neutrality vis-à-vis religions, respecting them and respecting religious opinions (art. 4 and X of the DDHC). The separation of temporal and spiritual power in the name of secularism should normally lead to a distinction, not a divorce. On the other hand, the union between the two must not lead to confusion. Thus, C. Hage Chahine states that.

In the doctrine of ‘healthy and legitimate secularism’, the ‘duality of powers’ is understood to mean a spiritual (religious) power and a temporal (political) power that are distinct but associated, human life being ‘a permanent connection between religion and politics’ [...]. [...] What is contrary to secularism is not the union but the confusion of the two spheres, religious and civil ^{(34, p. 57)}.

If union, and not uniformity, is legitimate to give a full meaning to the notion of secularism, the FC intends something else. In the name of this constitutional secularism ^{(35, pp. 93-95)}, the Church is kept “out of all undertakings and affairs that concern real life, ‘the reality of life’“ ^{(34, p. 56)}, which constitutes an obstacle to any kind of cooperation, particularly in the field of bioethics. This was endorsed by President François Hollande in 2013. Indeed, when the National advisory committee on ethics (Comité consultatif national d’éthique, CCNE) was renewed, no religious person is no longer a committee member. These are clerics from the three monotheistic religions: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. From now on, religious representation will be limited to non-religious representatives of the “main philosophical and spiritual families”. This decision has provoked numerous reactions from “religious authorities who were not consulted with a view to renewal” ⁽³⁶⁾. According to deputy S. Berrios, such a radical change threatens the usefulness, legitimacy, independence, credibility and neutrality of the CCNE ⁽³⁷⁾.

However, in the field of bioethics, biopower must not be exercised in an absolute manner. Both religious and political authorities must seek the common good of citizens and focus on the human person and his dignity, defending his rights and showing him his duties. Collaboration (CSDC 425) is urgently required, while insisting that collaboration “implies neither fusion nor separation” ^{(33, p. 332)}.

In this context, it’s important to remember that in the crucial questions that affect life, particularly in the biomedical world, it’s important to have an integral vision of the human person; this implies the importance of a place for his or her spiritual dimension, which alone marks the transcendence of the person ^{(6, pp. 124-128)}. It is pointless and absurd to deny the fact that “believers and unbelievers generally agree on this point: everything on earth must be ordered to man as its center and summit” ^{(38, n. 12)}. The ontologically grounded rational discourse of personalist bioethics is a constant reminder of this.