Resumo

SAMPEDRO, Adrián. The Nature of Subject and the Argument from Unity. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2019, vol.51, n.152, pp.85-111.  Epub 28-Dez-2020. ISSN 0011-1503.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.10.

In the present work I inspect several answers to the question raised by Descartes What Am I? I suggest that, although the proposal that I am identical to my human organism or to some part of it (the thesis embraced by materialists) is thought to be the most plausible in nowadays scientific viewpoint, it faces a problem that seems intractable, namely: the problem of accounting the identity-dependence between mental states and their subjects. Finally, I contend that the genuine bearers of mental states are, in the broad sense of the term, unitary subjects of experience, rather than persons.

Palavras-chave : persons; primary-kind properties; first-person perspective; identity criteria; individuation.