Resumo

GOMEZ-TORRENTE, Mario. El Wittgenstein de Kripke y la analogía entre reglas y fundamentos. Diánoia [online]. 2005, vol.50, n.55, pp.55-94. ISSN 0185-2450.

I explore an argument for epistemic non-factualism, the thesis that epistemic attributions do not describe facts. The argument is analogous to but independent of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument for non-factualism about rule-following. Some objections to the two arguments are considered and rejected, in particular accusations of incoherence and “reductivism”. The epistemic argument and a “skeptical solution” to it are argued to be part of Wittgenstein’s conception in On Certainty.

Palavras-chave : knowledge; meaning; skepticism; non-factualism.