Resumo

CRELIER, Andrés. Wittgenstein and the Attribution of Mental States to non-Human Animals: the Ability Approach or Form of Life Contextualism. Diánoia [online]. 2022, vol.67, n.88, pp.25-53.  Epub 21-Nov-2022. ISSN 0185-2450.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.2022.88.1892.

I discuss two alternative versions of the later Wittgenstein’s position on the attribution of psychological concepts to non-human animals: the “abilities’ approach” (Glock 2017) and the “form of life contextualism” (von Savigny 2016). I then use these construals as frameworks in which to interpret recent research in animal cognition. Section 1 introduces the exegetical problem and the next sections present each one of the approaches (sections 2 and 3). Section 4 claims that one should complement both perspectives, and Section 5 makes use of the Wittgensteinian frame to understand the way in which recent scientific research on animal cognition develops its explanatory hypotheses.

Palavras-chave : animal mind; animal cognition, patterns of behavior; cognitive abilities without language; social concepts in animals; normativity in animals.

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