Resumo

GENSOLLEN, Mario. Conductismo lógico y autoconocimiento. Alegato en pro de la primera persona. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2006, n.31, pp.103-134. ISSN 0188-6649.  https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v31i1.186.

This article analyzes the problem of self-knowledge through two opposite postures: cartesian dualism and logical conductism. Is self-knowledge infallible, as Descartes thought? Or, rather, self-knowledge is only possible on third per-son’s perspective? The goal is to show that the problem of self-knowledge only can be solved from the outside of a epistemological perspective.

Palavras-chave : self-knowledge; logical conductism; Gilbert Ryle; Stanley Cavell; Ludwig Wittgenstein.