Resumo

HERNANDEZ MARIN, Rafael. Sobre ontología jurídica e interpretación del Derecho. Isonomía [online]. 2008, n.29, pp.33-78. ISSN 1405-0218.

Ontologically speaking, my contention is that Law is composed of utterances. These legal utterances are elements that comprise Law and precede interpretative activity. The interpretative activity that addresses such utterances, that is, interpretation of Law, focuses on those designated as <<interpretative utterances>>. Interpretative utterances differ from judicial utterances not only by the fact that the former are not legal utterances (insofar as interpretation does not create the elements of law), but also by the fact that interpretative utterances are assertive utterances: they can be true or false, while legal utterances cannot be assertive in most cases, and because interpretative utterances are meta-linguistic with respect to legal utterances.

Palavras-chave : Legal interpretation; legal ontology; legal utterance; interpretative utterance; objectivity.