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Signos filosóficos
versão impressa ISSN 1665-1324
Sig. Fil vol.7 no.13 Ciudad de México Jan./Jun. 2005
Artículos
¿Es legítima la justificación regla-circular de la inducción?1
* Profesor-investigador de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa, México. cintora@prodigy.net.mx.
Se argumenta que la justificación regla-circular de la inducción defendida, entre otros, por David Papineau no es legítima, es decir, no constituye una genuina justificación.
Palabras claves: inducción; regla-circularidad; premisa-circularidad; circularidad virtuosa; circularidad viciosa
It is argued that the rule-circular justification of induction proposed by David Papineau is illegitimate, that is, that it is not a genuine justification.
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Recibido: 19 de Julio de 2004; Aprobado: 10 de Noviembre de 2004
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