Resumo

PINTO, Sílvio. Hacia una Justificación trascendental de la Inducción. Sig. Fil [online]. 2007, vol.9, n.18, pp.127-160. ISSN 1665-1324.

With the discovery of Bayesian inductive logic optimism about the possibility of rationally justifying inductive inference has been renewed. The justification of Bayesian inductive rules is known as the Dutch-book argument (Ramsey-de Finetti theorem). The question dividing theoreticians of induction is whether such an argument can really justify Bayes’ and Jeffrey’s conditionalization rules (Bayesian inductive rules). In this paper, I will be interested, first, in distinguishing two senses of justification of inductive inference: on the one hand, persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, its explicative justification. Secondly, I will relate the problem of the justification of Bayesian conditionalization rules with Hume’s classical problem of persuasively justifying causality and induction. Thirdly, I shall argue that the Dutch-book argument cannot persuasively justify Bayesian conditionalization rules in agreement with Hume’s negative thesis concerning non-circular justification of inductive inference of a causal type. Finally, I will suggest a sort of explicative justification of Bayesian inductive rules in terms of a transcendental argument of kantian inspiration but davidsonian in its style.

Palavras-chave : bayesianism; causality; conditionalization; explanation; induction.