Resumo

ESQUISABEL, Oscar M.  e  GAIADA, María Griselda. Leibniz’s God against the distinction between duty and will. Sig. Fil [online]. 2016, vol.18, n.36, pp.8-37. ISSN 1665-1324.

In this article, we analize the proposition “God always chooses the best” in order to consider what kind of necessity operates there. In view of Leibniz’s refusal of the geometrical necessity in the divine free choice, we examine what the relationship between Intellect and good is. In other words, should reason judge primarily what is good or best? Likewise, we study the link between Will and good, since the second one seems to be, at the same time, the natural object of will. In both cases, the analysis is applied to God as well as to rational creatures. An apparent inconsistency arises when the same object (the good) is disputed by Intellect and Will. Although the examination of good may fall into one or other faculty, depending on the writing context, our aim is to show that there is no point in attributing that issue to God. In sum, the ambivalence fades when we notice that the gap between duty and will is actually a human fiction.

Palavras-chave : principle of the best; intellect; will; real good; apparent good; freedom.