Resumo

NEGRETTO, Gabriel L.. Constitutional Reform in Mexico. Notes for a Future Discussion.Traduzido porVirgilio Chávez de la Torre. Polít. gob [online]. 2006, vol.13, n.2, pp.361-392. ISSN 1665-2037.

Since 2000, Mexican politics has changed in two important ways. First, the PRI’s defeat in the 2000 elections has ended a 70-year long one-party system. Second, the president no longer holds a majority in either chamber of a bicameral congress. In what is likely to be a new era of divided government, constitutional engineers proposed a multitude of constitutional reforms to promote good governance under a separation of powers system. While some reforms attempt to decrease the likelihood of minority presidents, others aim at strengthening the constitutional powers of the president. This paper argues that a viable and desirable strategy of constitutional change should avoid these two extremes. Instead, reforms should generate incentives to promote inter-branch cooperation during divided government. This paper discusses the benefits of a partial reform consisting of two parts: 1) electoral rules that promote correspondence between the preferences of citizens and those of policy makers and 2) constitutional powers that encourage coordination between the president and the congress in the process of policy making and cabinet formation.

Palavras-chave : constitutional reform; presidentialism; divided government; Latin America; Mexico.