SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
 número13Agencia y responsabilidad legal: consideraciones epistémicas y moralesBases para una reconstrucción estructural de los principios penales en el ámbito del control de constitucionalidad índice de autoresíndice de assuntospesquisa de artigos
Home Pagelista alfabética de periódicos  

Serviços Personalizados

Journal

Artigo

Indicadores

Links relacionados

  • Não possue artigos similaresSimilares em SciELO

Compartilhar


Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho

versão On-line ISSN 2448-7937versão impressa ISSN 2007-4387

Resumo

CHAVEZ-FERNANDEZ POSTIGO, José. Manuel Atienza’s Argumentative Approach and the Standard Theory: Two Problems and a Solution. Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho [online]. 2019, n.13, pp.129-160.  Epub 19-Maio-2020. ISSN 2448-7937.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2019.13.13718.

In contemporary debates in legal reasoning Professor Manuel Atienza has coined a term which has gained certain notoriety amongst theorists of legal argumentation: “the standard theory of legal argumentation”. Despite the relative success of the term, there is some controversy about two connected questions: its allegedly usefulness, on one hand; and the kind of argumentative models that could be included in it, on the other. This paper purposes to answer both questions by claiming that Atienza’s argumentative model might be an instance of a “standard theory”, but only if it is understood in a way that is “external” to the model of Kantian rationality. At the same time, this argument will show that the term is useful for improving legal reasoning theories.

Palavras-chave : Atienza; Standard Theory; Legal Argumentation; Kantian Rationality; Aristotelic Rationality.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol