Resumo

SOLIS DELGADILO, Diego  e  CORTEZ SALINAS, Josafat. Three Contracts, Three Uncertainties: The Configuration of Institutional Solutions in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho [online]. 2019, n.13, pp.321-344.  Epub 19-Maio-2020. ISSN 2448-7937.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2019.13.13724.

This paper analyzes how different understandings of social uncertainty lead to different frameworks for institutional design. For this, the ideas of social contract theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, are examined from the approach of Rational Choice Institutionalism. The argument is that the social contract theories, defended by each of these authors, aim to overcome problems of uncertainty. However, given their historical circumstances, each political thinker conceived uncertainty differently, which ultimately has consequences for the way in which institutions distribute political power.

Palavras-chave : Institutions; Uncertainty; Cooperation Action; Social Contract.