Resumo

VARGAS H., Hernando  e  BETANCOURT G., Rocío. Amenazas a la independencia del banco central y su efecto en la inflación. El trimestre econ [online]. 2010, vol.77, n.305, pp.105-128. ISSN 2448-718X.

The lack of political support for low inflation and the existence of serious threats of Central Bank Independence (CBI) removal may induce a gradual approach to disinflation by an independent and committed Central Bank (CB). A simple two-period model is used to link two facts observed in Colombia: the gradual disinflation process and the repeated threats to CBI coming from policymakers (Congress and the Government). The model is based on the assumption that, by itself, the CB is independent and directly able to commit to announced inflation targets. Nevertheless, policymakers want the discretionary solution and try to remove the independent and committed CB if the target differs from it. These external threats to the CBI hamper its ability to commit and result in a gradual path of disinflation that lies above the levels of inflation chosen by a committed CB in the absence of threats to its independence.

Palavras-chave : independencia del banco central; amenazas a la IBC; metas de inflación.