Background:

The use of derivative instruments, as corporate policy to hedge financial risks has a positive impact on the firm value. However, in countries characterized by weak legal protection of the investors’ rights and ownership structures highly concentrated, like in Chile, majority shareholders could use this policy to extract wealth from minority shareholders.

Methods:

Using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), this paper analyzes a panel of 133 nonfinancial companies listed on the Santiago de Chile Stock Ex-change between 2008 and 2013.

Results:

The results indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship be-tween the amount of derivatives used and the company value. However, this evidence is conditioned when the majority shareholder (s) keep the control of the company. If the main shareholder or the three major shareholders hold more than 67% of the outstanding shares, then the relationship between the amount of derivatives used and firm value is negative.

Conclusion:

In analyzing the dynamics between the ownership concentration and the use of derivatives, we findout that when the majority shareholders and the three largest shareholders majority quorum to vote, then they use derivatives to protect their own wealth. Such strategy is negatively assessed by market, pro-viding evidence of the wealth redistribution hypothesis between the controllers and the minority shareholders.