Resumo

SKIDELSKY, Liza. The Doxastic-Subdoxastic Distinction. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2007, vol.39, n.115, pp.31-60. ISSN 0011-1503.

In this paper I discuss the criteria that have been postulated for a principled distinction between doxastic states and subdoxastic states, namely: accesibility to consciousness (Stich 1978), inferential integration (Stich 1978), and conceptualization (Davies 1986, 1989). The discussion set off from the analysis of the arguments put forward by Davies (1989). My claim is that although there would be an intuitive distinction among certain kinds of mental states, according to two plausible readings of what Davies himself proposes as a principled criterion, such criteria do not seem to establish it.

Palavras-chave : information-processing states; intentional states; non-conceptual content; personal-subpersonal distinction.