Resumo

CESPEDES, Esteban. A defense of the contrastive theory of causation. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2015, vol.47, n.140, pp.93-99.  Epub 20-Fev-2020. ISSN 0011-1503.

An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.

Palavras-chave : contrastivism; counterfactual conditional; general causation; singular causation; causal claim.