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Crítica (México, D.F.)
versão impressa ISSN 0011-1503
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FISHER, Sarah A.. Rationalising Framing Effects: At Least One Task for Empirically Informed Philosophy. Crítica (Méx., D.F.) [online]. 2020, vol.52, n.156, pp.5-30. Epub 13-Set-2021. ISSN 0011-1503. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221.
Human judgements are affected by the words in which information is presented -or ‘framed’. According to the standard gloss, ‘framing effects’ reveal counter-normative reasoning, unduly affected by positive/negative language. One challenge to this view suggests that number expressions in alternative framing conditions are interpreted as denoting lower-bounded (minimum) quantities. However, it is unclear whether the resulting explanation is a rationalising one. I argue that a number expression should only be interpreted lower-boundedly if this is what it actually means. I survey how number expressions might be assigned lower-bounded meanings, due to their conventional semantics or pragmatic enrichment in context. I argue that deciding between these possibilities requires foundational philosophical input.
Palavras-chave : cognitive bias; rationality; number expressions; semantics; pragmatics.