Resumo

BOUNDI CHRAKI, Fahd. The political economy of the autonomy of the European Central Bank. Inv. Econ [online]. 2020, vol.79, n.312, pp.113-139.  Epub 28-Dez-2020. ISSN 0185-1667.  https://doi.org/10.22201/fe.01851667p.2020.312.75374.

Based on the classical political economy’s theories of surplus, production and money, the aim of the paper is to enquire the logic behind the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB). Along this line of reasoning, the following hypothesis is put forth and tested: The ECB has used both the real unit labour costs (RULC) and the general profit rate as fundamental instruments to achieve economic growth and price stability in the Eurozone during the period 1999-2018. A Panel ARDL model and Granger causality test were applied to empirically contrast the above hypothesis.

Palavras-chave : ECB; Eurozone; classical political economy; panel ARDL; causality; E52; E58; P16.

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