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Revista mexicana de sociología

versão On-line ISSN 2594-0651versão impressa ISSN 0188-2503

Resumo

MAIZ, Ramón. Jama, Caleta y Camello: Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Mechanism of Political Clientelism. Rev. Mex. Sociol [online]. 2003, vol.65, n.1, pp.3-39. ISSN 2594-0651.

This article seeks to explain the joint empirical presence of corruption and political clientelism in Latin America and to explore their structural relations. It therefore proceeds to describe the individual rationalism behind the clientelist mechanism and its attraction for voters without resources. It then examines the difficulties of dealing with the demand for goods and services for clients in neoliberal contexts and the growing competition with party programs and its final result; the progressive overlapping of patron-client networks with those of political corruption.

Palavras-chave : clientelism; corruption; political parties; networks.

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