Resumo

NEGRETTO, Gabriel L.. Constitutional Desing and Separation of Power in Latin America. Rev. Mex. Sociol [online]. 2003, vol.65, n.1, pp.41-75. ISSN 2594-0651.

This article provides a critical review of the model of checks and balances on which Latin American presidential regimes were originally founded. It argues that this model no longer comprises a normatively desirable design strategy nor does it serve as a criterion for the separation of powers adopted by most Latin American constitutions. Bearing in mind the design alternatives that exist in this region, the study offers a different view of the separation of powers in which it will be possible to combine representative pluralism with the ability to adopt effective decisions.

Palavras-chave : constitutional design; separation of powers; presidential rule; Latin America; democracy.

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