Resumo

MONTERO, Julio C.. Por qué una concepción restrictiva de la razón pública viola la neutralidad estatal: una crítica interna al liberalismo político. Isonomía [online]. 2009, n.30, pp.101-116. ISSN 1405-0218.

The central thesis of this article is that the conception of the public reason defended by Rawls, even in its "inclusive" version, is excessively restrictive and infringes the liberal principle of legitimacy and the idea that the state must remain neutral among the several comprehensive doctrines endorsed by its citizens. Finally, an alternative conception of the liberal public reason, which I call the "open conception", is proposed. This conception is grounded only on a basic duty of civility, namely the duty of reciprocity.

Palavras-chave : Duty of civility; deliberative democracy; legitimacy; neutrality; public reason.