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EconoQuantum
versão On-line ISSN 2007-9869versão impressa ISSN 1870-6622
Resumo
FLORES-ZARUR, Karla e OLVERA-LOPEZ, William. Simultaneous auctions of identical items by first-price close mechanism with a bonus for buyers. EconoQuantum [online]. 2022, vol.19, n.2, pp.83-92. Epub 02-Jun-2023. ISSN 2007-9869. https://doi.org/10.18381/eq.v19i2.7270.
Objective:
In this paper we study, from the seller’s perspective, how to auction a finite set of identical items when the buyer who obtains the whole set of goods (if any) gets a bonus, such that the seller maximizes his expected revenue and taking into account the strategic behavior of the bidders.
Methodology:
We use Bayesian Games for modelling the situation considering a strategy space equal to for each bidder.
Results:
We show a Symmetric Bayesian Equilibrium for the model as well as the seller’s indifference between several natural ways for offering the bonus to a bidder getting the whole set of items, because he obtains the same expected revenue.
Limitations:
The model regards only identical items.
Originality:
We show an equilibrium bid for a n-personal model of m Simultaneous Auctions under first-price close mechanism considering that there is a kind of extra profit.
Conclusions:
The seller is indifferent between several ways to offer the bonus. It could be interesting to contrast the theoretical results under an experimental framework.
Palavras-chave : Auctions; First Price Mechanism; Bayesian Games; Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Seller's Expected Revenue; C72; C73.