3.1. Radical Experimentalism and Skepticism about Intuition

At least some part of the XΦ movement aims at criticizing TAP’s method and its underlying assumptions. Their experiments show how diverse our intuitions are and how many factors interfere with such an appeal; for example, emotions, prior education, the rhetoric of the story suggested, etc. It seems then that intuitions do not arise solely from conceptual rules. Moreover they indicate that, given all the factors that interfere with any appeal to intuition, people will never report the same intuition. Different cultural backgrounds, intellectual habits, knowledge, etc., generate different intuitions. It becomes clear that philosophers’ intuitions do not stand for any unanimous presumptions, dispositions or rules. Moreover, if different groups or communities report different intuitions, their epistemic principles will probably vary as well. Intuition analysis has no way of telling us which, if any of them, has epistemic privilege.

However, all these objections have been expressed long before XΦ, and some times from philosophical armchairs. It has been suggested that conceptual rules are not independent from empirical knowledge or beliefs; therefore intuitions do not come from the community’s purely conceptual dispositions and norms; people’s beliefs generate them. Those beliefs may be widespread; they may arise from tacit theories. Yet, this does not prevent them from being wrong and/or open to revision or elimination.⁵

On many an occasion other scientists’ empirical studies have been cited to supplement this line of criticism. Many psychological experiments have shown that lots of factors influence our intuitions and that intuition cannot offer the detached understanding traditionalists connect it with.⁶ Many statistical surveys show that our intuitive judgments are wrong most of the time (^{Bishop and Trout 2005}). On the face of all these attacks, one may wonder what new experimentalists bring against TAP’s appeal to intuition.

Experimental philosophers no longer rely on other scientists’ studies. This allows XΦ to examine intuitions about concepts of high philosophical importance. They show how diverse and unreliable our intuition is when confronted with philosophical questions. I think this is what the Gettier-case (^{Weinberg et al. 2001}) and the Kripke-case (^{Nichols et al. 2003}) studies aim at. They want to show that one cannot draw any general theory about knowledge or reference based solely on intuition. Those experiments rely on Stich’s hypothesis that reflective equilibrium cannot help when forming philosophical theories, since different communities may have very different epistemic standards (^{Stich 1990}, ¹⁹⁹⁸⁾. Some thought Stich’s suggestion was unrealistic (^{Pollock and Cruz 1999, p. 150}). Studies however provide strong evidence that different communities do in fact have different epistemic norms.

Experimental studies criticizing TAP are the ones that have been challenged the most. They are seen as a threat to any appeal to intuition; and consequently as a threat to philosophy itself as traditionally conducted. Thus, ^{Sosa (2007)} claims experimental techniques cannot explain why subjects disagree, nor can they assure that the folk get the stories right; ^{Kauppinen (2007)} and ^{Jackman (2009}) suggests that philosophy should analyze the robust intuitions of the philosophers rather than the surface intuitions of the folk; ^{Williamson (2004)} and ^{Sosa (2006}, ²⁰⁰⁸⁾ argue that once we abandon philosophers’ hope-lessly demanding operational standard for evidence, we will see that we can trust intuition, just like we trust perception or introspection as a corrigible evidence. Moreover, ^{Liao (2008)} proposes that even radical experimentalists rely on intuition for their very criticism.

However, none of these arguments stands against the radical experimentalists’ main point. For none suggests that a theory can be proven right just by appealing to our pre-theoretical intuitions.

Radical experimentalists only show the defects of TAP’s method. They provide evidence against the suggestion that we all share similar dispositions and norms. Moreover they challenge the claim that the philosopher can represent the average language user. Hence they propose that philosophy cannot rely on intuition. This line of criticism has been suggested before. Empirical support makes it slightly more aggressive. Still, if the so-called radical experimentalists are interpreted as providing a critical comment against traditionalists’ method, they are not that radical after all. They just build on a coherent criticism. Philosophizing cannot rely solely on intuition. In the next section, I will try to show that it is actually the methods of the moderate experimentalists that face serious problems.

3.2. Moderate Experimentalists’ Appeal to Intuition

Experimentalists confront the armchair method; yet many share TAP’s underlying assumption that philosophy relates to common sense. In their view, the intuitive responses of the folk can challenge or support philosophical theses. Thus, they often imply that a theory, which accords with laypersons’ intuitions, has a theoretical advantage over opposing ones.

For example, Nahmias, Morris, ^{Nadelhoffer and Turner (2005)}:

agree with ^{Jackson (1998)} that the fundamental issue in the free will debate should be “whether free action according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to our ordinary conception, exists and is compatible with determinism” and that to identify our ordinary conception we must “appeal to what seems to us most obvious and central about free action [ . . . ] as revealed by our intuitions about possible cases”. (^{Jackson 1998, p. 31}; ^{Nahmias et al. 2005, p. 564})

Philosophy is attached with common sense. Philosophers talk about notions that trouble ordinary people as well; their analyses can only help insofar as they relate to ordinary notions. The same argument can be found in many XΦ papers.⁷ In “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto”, ^{Knobe and Nichols (2008a)} defend the philosophical importance of XΦ using the same argument. They suggest that philosophy (or at least some of its branches, like epistemology) is related to commonsensical intuitions since many philosophical problems arise from common sense.

Indeed, for many standard philosophical problems [ . . . ] if it weren’t for the commonsense intuitions, there wouldn’t be a felt philosophical problem. The problem of moral responsibility for example [ . . . ] arises because people think of themselves as morally responsible, and it seems at odds with other important and plausible world views. (^{Knobe and Nichols 2008a, pp. 8-9})

Common sense and its contradicting dispositions make an issue feel like a problem. This is why a philosophical theory should take ordinary intuitions into account. Free will and moral responsibility seem to be clear examples that philosophical worries arise because common sense faces certain contradictions.

This claim, however, is not supported by their experiments. In their studies concerning free will and moral responsibility, we see the folk not feeling the problem at all. In the Jeremy experiment above, the folk think Jeremy acts on his own free will and that he is responsible for stealing a bank/ saving a child/ going jogging, even when all of his actions are subject to deterministic laws and have been predicted by the super computer before he was born. The majority of laypersons do not seem to recognize any contradiction between a fully deterministic world and Jeremy’s free will and responsibility. It seems then that the problem of free will or moral responsibility does not arise “because people think of themselves as morally responsible, and it seems at odds with other important and plausible world views” (^{Knobe and Nichols 2008a, p. 9}). To the majority of the folk, their being responsible for their actions is not at odds with other views about how the world works. The experiment with Jeremy is only one among many ^{Nahmias et al. (2005)} used to show that free will is in fact not a felt philosophical problem at all. Hence Nahmias et al. entail that compatibilism is intuitive.

When we appeal to folk intuitions about possible cases, like Jackson, Knobe and Nichols, or Nahmias et al. invite us to do, we end up with no felt philosophical problems. It is rather philosophers who recognize the problems. At some level then, philosophers and the folk do use moral responsibility, free will, etc., differently. The relation between philosophical problems and folk intuitions may not be as close as either moderate experimentalists or traditionalists believe.

Experimentalists can bypass the problem. Besides, many have suggested that philosophy should only be interested in philosophers’ intuitions since they are better trained in introspection than the folk (^{Kaupinnen 2007}, ^{Stroud 2000}). “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto” replies that, even if this were true, it should not defer us from conducting experiments. In fact, philosophical experiments will help understand how philosophers’ intuitions differ from those carried by ordinary people and, most importantly, why:

We would love to know about the ways in which philosophers differ from ordinary folks, and it seems to us the best way to find out would be to run some experiments. [ . . . ] Furthermore even if we discover important differences between the philosophers and the folk, it would hardly follow that the data from the folk are irrelevant. Rather the whole pattern of the data might tell us something important about the ultimate source of the philosophical problems. (^{Knobe and Nichols 2008a, p. 10})

Experimental techniques determine whether philosophers’ intuitions are different from those of laypersons. Such studies might even clarify the source of philosophical problems. The implication here is that philosophers have peculiar reasoning patterns, which create the philosophical problems. Although philosophers make less reasoning mistakes, “the folk are less likely to have their intuitions biased by extensive philosophical training and theoretical affiliations” (^{Knobe and Nichols 2008a, p. 10}). It seems then that philosophical training and intellectual habits create the philosophical problems.

If the philosophical peculiarities create the problems though, then those problems are not as closely related to common sense as suggested above. Of course, we can go on investigating the differences between commonsensical intuitions and those held by philosophers just for the sake of it. We can try to find some kind of evidence that philosophers have actually created the problem. However, even if we somehow prove that philosophers’ reasoning strategies or theoretically biased intuitions are the source of philosophical problems, this does not mean that philosophers are wrong in creating them. Their training may help them see aspects of reality that laypersons do not.

Indeed, many philosophers have suggested that folk conceptions should be critically examined.⁸ Some of our beliefs and intuitions may even need revision or elimination. Philosophy should test folk intuitions rather than rely on them. Again, Knobe and Nichols propose that, in order to test or revise folk intuitions one should get to know those intuitions first (^{2008a, p. 10}). Many experimentalists suggest the same:

Even if “free will” is a technical concept, it will have to be at least constrained by the non-technical concepts and practices of responsibility attribution if it is to do the work the philosophical community has set for it [ . . . ]. These moves suggest that certain theories of free will and moral responsibility may require us to revise some, but not all, of our current concepts, beliefs, and practices about freedom and responsibility [ . . . ]. But in order to know whether a particular theory demands revision (or even elimination) of our concepts, beliefs, or practices, we have to know what these are. (^{Nahmias et al. 2005, p. 577}; italics are mine.)

So even if we conclude that a certain concept or belief of ours needs revision or elimination, we have to know what exactly the folk intuit and then revise it. However, it is far from obvious that we actually need to write down all our intuitions in order to know exactly what we need to abandon in case some revision in our belief system is required. Revision of beliefs does not seem to work that way. One does not have to know their dispositions in order to alter them. Surveys might not actually be needed then. But then, again, one can choose to do the groundwork and register the community’s intuitions anyway.

So far, experimentalists suggest empirical research is useful. It could help us realize our beliefs or find the source of philosophical problems. Yet, none of these claims entails that those intuitions can help answer those problems. In fact, experimentalists claim they accept that laypersons’ beliefs may require modification. Folk intuitions cannot determine whether a theory is correct.

Despite their cautious remarks though, some clearly suggest that if a theory accords with common sense, it has a theoretical advantage. For example, according to ^{Nahmias et al. 2008} (the example with Jeremy and the super-computer), people seem to believe in some form of compatibilism. This implies that since compatibilism is intuitive it is a plausible theory: “a theory of free will that accords with those intuitions relevant to things we care about, such as ascriptions of moral responsibility, has, all else being equal, a theoretical advantage over a theory that demands revision or elimination of such intuitions” (^{Nahmias et al. 2008, p. 85}). A theory that has common-sensical intuitions on its side then has a theoretical advantage. At the very least: “if a philosophical theory does turn out to be privileged by the endorsement of the folk, that would seem to position the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who argue contrary to folk intuitions” (^{Nahmias et al. 2005, p. 564}). When a theory accords with laypersons’ intuitions, it is privileged. The burden of proof is on the theory that contradicts common sense.

Many support the view that theories siding with common sense have some kind of advantage over other theories. Such an implication underlies their practice. Studies discussing free will (^{Nahmias et al. 2005}, ²⁰⁰⁸) probably started in order to confront the armchair intuitions of incompatibilists philosophers like Robert ^{Kane (1999)}, Galen ^{Strawson (1986)}, etc. But now the list is growing longer and longer. And different studies show alternative theses to be supported by common sense. Experiments are interpreted alternatively as either allying with compatibilism (^{Turner and Nahmias 2006}, ^{Nahmias 2006}) or some forms of incompatibilism (^{Nichols 2004}). Thus ^{Nichols (2004)} suggests that the folk supports a libertarian notion of free will that is incompatible with determinism; Turner and ^{Nahmias (2006)} challenge Nichols’ interpretation and ^{Nahmias (2006)} concludes that only certain kinds of reductionistic descriptions of decision-making are incompatible with free will, whereas the folk does not really pick determinism as a threat to free will and moral responsibility. Nahmias uses both Nichols studies, as well as some of its own, to suggest that the folk may see reductionism as incompatible with free will, but they do not consider that determinism is incompatible with free will. He bravely concludes: “Well, what else would you expect from a compatibilist? I’m just trying to sell my own intuitions like any good philosopher (though I have at least supplemented my claims with some empirical work on pre-philosophical intuitions)” (^{Nahmias 2006, p. 234}). The free will debate, as conducted within the community of experimental philosophy, shows that experimental methods are used in order to promote different philosophical theories. It is not my point here to enter the free will debate but rather to comment on how experimentalists use intuitions. Of course, they do not claim that such theories are true or correct because common sense allies with them (^{Nahmias et al. 2008, p. 97}). Yet, those theories are expected to have some sort of advantage over alternative ones. Some experimentalists are cautious enough as to suggest that traditionalists first put the burden of proof primarily on those confronting common sense (^{Nahmias et al. 2005, p. 577}). Yet moderate experimentalists never take issue with this suggestion. Quite on the contrary, most of the experimental endeavor these days implies that philosophical theories that accord with common sense are privileged.

Folk intuitions then carry a strong argumentation value. Such a claim is still highly problematic for the experimentalist too.⁹

Many have blamed traditionalists for stretching their own common-sensical or grammatical intuitions to fit their philosophical theories.

Now, experimentalists also impose philosophical theories on common sense. In some cases, they ask for ordinary intuitions while describing highly extraordinary cases. The experiment with Jeremy, for example, describes an extraordinary, science-fiction story about which we cannot have any commonsensical intuitions. Normally, the situation itself is supposed to guide us. However, it is very difficult to intuitively prescribe whether Jeremy robs the bank of his own free Will when the context is out of the ordinary; or when our beliefs are being questioned. One cannot appeal to common sense while challenging it.¹⁰

The peculiarity of the thought experiment described is, however, only part of the problem. After all, on many occasions their stories are not that extraordinary. Still, the moment the folk are asked to vote for or against philosophical theories, experimentalists impose theories on common sense.¹¹ And this seems to happen in all XΦ’s papers. Experimentalists first lay down a map of the philosophical theories suggested on an issue, and then they run their experiments trying to figure out which theory best accords with common sense. Are the folk compatibilists or incompatibilists? And if incompatibilists, are they libertarians or hard determinists? Is determinism considered a threat to free will or is it reductionism instead? Philosophical discussions about free will may be generated from the ordinary notion. Regardless, compatibilism, incompatibilism, determinism, reductionism, etc., are technical philosophical theories. Even if philosophical problems were related to common sense, this would not entail that common sense can vote for or against philosophical doctrines. Folk intuitions might be more diverse, more perplexed or more incoherent than any of these theories. And, from what philosophical experiments entail, they probably are.

As ^{Nahmias (2006, p. 234)} humorously admits, philosophers have always tried to sell their own intuitions as everyone’s. Long discussions of TAP’ methodology suggest that traditionalists have always had great difficulty bypassing this line of criticism. And now things are far worse for XΦ.

Some traditionalists claimed that pre-theoretical intuitions could only help if one wants to dismantle a philosophical problem. J.L. Austin, for example, whom some experimentalists cite as a precursor of their method (^{Alexander and Weinberg 2007, p. 18}), argues that one cannot appeal to ordinary intuitions when the situation is extraordinary (^{Austin 1961, p. 67}). And he implies that philosophy itself is extraordinary insomuch as it seeks for general explanations. Thus he mostly appeals to ordinary intuitions in an attempt to “dismantle” philosophical doctrines “before (they) get off the ground” (^{Austin 1964, p. 142}). So far, experimentalists do not suggest they aim at the dissolution of philosophical problems. Contrariwise, they try to promote philosophical theories using common sense.¹²

Yet, people can be wrong. In fact folk intuitions have been wrong many times. TAP tried to suggest that their intuitions are generated by the normative use of concepts; they argued this conceptual level is somehow more basic than tacit theories or other random factors that may interfere with our every day claims. They appealed to informed or reflective intuitions thinking they reveal the community’s epistemic norms. Experimentalists, on the contrary, accept (and have even offered evidence to show) that intuitions are not solely generated by norms; intuitions come from tacit beliefs, emotions, intellectual habits, etc. None of the above is suggested as being reliable. But then one cannot justify the use of intuitions in the place of solid arguments; neither can they rely on intuitions in order to promote philosophical theories. For everyone’s intuitions can be biased from all those factors.

Experimentalists have shown how flexible intuitions are. The mere consideration of a previous thought experiment can change the intuition we report when considering another (^{Swain et al. 2006}). Different experiments trigger different intuitions on the same subject (^{Nahmias 2006}). Emotions also influence intuitions. Folk intuitions then are very easy to manipulate. And if they are so flexible, then common sense cannot support any general theory; we can just manipulate it and deliver whatever result we need. What is more, the same studies can be interpreted differently.¹³

On top of this, lies an additional problem: the folk disagree. Experimentalists say that the issue of epistemic criterion does not concern them any more than it would some other philosopher (^{Knobe and Nichols 2008, p. 10}). Yet, if this is a problem for traditionalists, it is even more worrying for experimentalists. Traditionalists have claimed that intuitions rely on conceptual norms and cannot vary much; that everyone would agree in ideal circumstances (that is, if thinking straight). Intuitions collected by philosophical reflection, supposedly arose from conceptual norms and were thus undisputed. Experimentalists, however, have opened Pandora’s box and such a claim can no longer fly. For all experiments show strong differences of opinion. They have moreover documented that different cultural or educational background, previous knowledge, habits, emotions, etc., influence our intuitions. Intuitions do not come from conceptual rules alone. Intuitions vary. So, which ones are to count as the intuition of the folk? Is it just the majority’s intuition? And what happens when we have contradicting majorities in different cultural or social groups, like in ^{Weinberg et al. 2001}, and Nichols et al. 2003? Are they both equally privileged or do we have to pick one and how are we supposed to do this? Experimentalists show that folk intuitions are never unanimous. Alternative world-views exist. Thus they can no longer overlook the problem of an epistemic criterion.

Experimentalists will have to take a clear stand on those problems. XΦ started out by recording intuitions. But the moment they tried to use those intuitions to advance philosophical theories, problems arise. Those problems may be even worse than those TAP had to face. For traditionalists accompanied their practice with a certain metaphilosophical view suggesting why and how those pre-theoretical intuitions are useful. Moderate experimentalists, on the other hand, have helped challenge all claims made by TAP, while keeping the same commitment to the appeal to intuitions.